WoCoLoR 4

THE FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS ON

LOGIC AND RELIGION

Sinaia, Romania, September 3-8, 2023


HANDBOOK

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
HANDBOOK OF THE FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS ON LOGIC AND RELIGION

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Handbook of the Fourth World Congress on Logic and Religion
Sinaia, Romania
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Logic and Religion Association (LARA)
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Contents

1. About the Congress

Although logic, a symbol of rationality, may appear to be opposed to religion, both have a long history of cooperation. Logical concepts and tools have always played important roles in the world's religious traditions. On the other hand, philosophical theology has provided many illustrious attempts to prove the existence of God, for example. Nevertheless, it seems that as an academic field, the area of logic and religion has not yet been consolidated.

The purpose of the World Congress on Logic and Religion (WoCoLoR) series is to bridge this gap by providing a place where scholars from all fields, as well as theologians of all religions, can come together to hear from one another about the latest developments in the relationship between logic and religion, reason and faith, rational inquiry and divine revelation. The WoCoLoR series is held by the Logic and Religion Association (LARA). Among the keynote speakers there were Saul Kripke (Schock Prize), Laurent Lafforgue (Fields Medal), Michal Heller (Templeton Prize), Dov Gabbay, Jan Wolenski and Piergiorgio Odifreddi.

After the first edition in João Pessoa, Brazil, in 2015, the second one in Warsaw, Poland, in 2017, and the third edition in Varanasi, India, in 2023, this 4th WoCoLoR takes place in Sinaia, Romania. It is held by LARA and sponsored by the Ian Ramsey Centre, University of Oxford, as a part of the project "New Horizons for Science and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe", funded by the John Templeton Foundation.

2. Organizing Comittees

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Logic, Experience and Awakening: Continuities in Buddhist Thought and Practice

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A great deal of entirely worthy effort has been expended in the last number of decades to convince Western academic audiences of the substantive philosophical value of South and East Asian ideas and thinkers. This effort is rightly ongoing, as the formal approaches to argumentation, analyses of consciousness and visions of the highest human good were in these traditions. And yet, while acknowledgment of the ultimately religious aims of many (certainly not all) classical Asian schools of thought and praxis is not absent in modern Western scholarly treatments, the bifurcation between Religious Studies and Philosophy in the contemporary academy, along with the intellectual borders and disciplinary vulnerabilities of these respective fields, have tended, on the Philosophy side of the divide, to somewhat marginalize religious goals while highlighting the theoretical accomplishments of Asian traditions. In this presentation, I set myself the task of re-emphasizing the degree to which the continuity between treatments of logic, explications of human experience and the project of human liberation from egoism, desire and destructive conduct were always a unity. In both South and East Asian Buddhist systems (Madhyamaka, Yogacara-Sautrantika, Chan), different from one another as they were, the most logical investigations of logic reveal its limits, and the most honestly and robustly descriptive revelations of experience are meant to actually make us not merely experts in a field, but consummate persons who are both genuinely freer and morally better.

Modal Ontological Arguments Revisited

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Classic ontological arguments are not valid. Modal ontological arguments (such as Goedel's, Malcolm's, Hartshorne's, Plantinga's, Fitting's) are a great deal of improvement on them. The talk will consider quantified modal logic machinery relevant for revisiting the ontological arguments. The language, the semantics and the proof theory of first-order and higher-order modal logic help with clearing up fallacies, e.g. ambiguities, and amphibolies, which are the source of the invalidity of classic ontological arguments. Are some contemporary modal versions of the ontological arguments valid? The talk will consider thoroughly the arguments for and against an affirmative answer to that crucial question when it comes to assessing ontological arguments.

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Face-to-Face: Exploring a Path of Reconciliation Inside the Nature

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The Face-to-Face project of the Orthodox Academy of Crete (OAC) began in 1983 with an invitation first to artists in Greece and later on all over the world, to reflect on the spiritual text below and express their understanding of it in a creative way.

Furthermore, in 1996 – and every year since then – the School for Gardening and Landscape Architecture in Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany), in cooperation with the OAC, has been working on a natural stone pathway in harmony with the natural environment. Their work, which includes mosaic floors and walls, is inspired by Saint Makarios of Egypt, the Great ascetic of the desert (ApophthegmataPateron, Migne P.G. 34:257-258):

One day, while Makarios was walking through the desert, he found a skull in the sand. The following dialogue took place:

MAKARIOS: Who are you?

SKULL: I was a priest of the pagans. When you pray for us who are in hell, we are consoled.

MAKARIOS: What is it like in hell? What kind of consolation do you feel?

SKULL: We are standing surrounded by flames reaching up to the sky. The worst torment of all is that we are tied back-to-back and thus cannot see each other's face - this is actual hell! But when you pray for us, the ropes become loose, and we can see each other again: Face-to-Face. That is reconciliation!

This dialogue between Saint Makarios and the skull is a metaphor for the confrontation of man with the "other", the fellow human being. Plautus stated that "homo homini lupus" (man is a wolf for man), and Jean-Paul Sartre expressed it in an even more tragic way, saying "L΄enferc΄estl΄autre" (hell is others). Here, the exact opposite is expressed, summarizingthe Christian belief: not the presence, but the absence of the other, the lack of communication, loneliness is the cause of pain and torment.

The question about reaching reconciliation, can beexplored through this natural stone pathway of the OAC, with includes pieces of art in-between of the natural beauty of the Cretan Seaand the mountains, as a path which leads to a small Chapel of Saint Makarios (inside a natural cave) – achieving reconciliation!

Lewis Carroll's Logic and Religion

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Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* books have enjoyed unabating popularity in the past 150 years, accompanied by unceasing popular interest in the only apparently enigmatic motives for the author's intention behind the so-called children's classic.

Significant scholarly attention has been directed at both Carroll's literary works, as well as his writings in Mathematics and Logic. Yet relatively little attention has been directed at the productive relationship between the two, and the significant role Charles Lutwidge Dodgson's religious beliefs played in it. As a result, these fields continue to be interpreted as a contradiction, which, in turn, serves as apparent evidence, within Carroll's biography, for a 'split personality', and, in his historical context, a literature-science or science-religion divide.

As this paper will, however, show, it is, in fact, the conjunction between Logic and Religion, that, like no other influence, shaped the spiritual moral and pedagogic convictions that led Carroll to pursue writing for children, and, in turn, forms their ideological underpinnings.

It will, firstly, reconstruct the historical and biographical background of how he came to understand the remit of Logic within Religion, its application in navigating contentious interpretations of scripture, and moderating public debates surrounding them, focusing on Carroll's own education, and the influence of his father, mathematician, logician, and Archdeacon Rev Charles Dodgson senior, prominent and vocal advocate of the Oxford Movement.

It will, secondly, trace how this background shaped Dodgson junior's understanding of Logic - in theological use, in interpretation of scripture for application of its teaching in everyday life – and by extension, its application in public discourse, and the moral questions at stake in it. It will examine how Carroll used Logic as tool to determine truth in deceptions and moral misleading constructed through rhetoric in a variety of fields – from contentious debates in religion, from free will to eternal punishment, to the morality of vivisection. This will illuminate the ways in which he promoted such theologically-inflected understandings of Logic, through children's works as Carroll's *Game of Logic* – and the *Alice* novels, allowing a complex understanding, of both the author, his times – and his "children's" literature as incisive philosophical, religious, and pedagogical intervention.

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Is Knowledge Made of a Harder Material than Faith? Mythos and Logos in Schopenhauer

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Schopenhauer's position to religion seems to be ambiguous. He has been called the "most Christian philosopher" as well as the "prince of Atheism". The ambiguity depends on his distinction between religion and philosophy, which at first sight seems clear and simple: In contrast with religion which is based on allegory and fables, philosophy conveys truth in a strict and proper sense. Standing in the tradition of enlightenment, Schopenhauer is convinced that truth will prevail, so that "knowledge is made of a harder material than faith, such when they collide, faith breaks". However, since philosophy differs not only from religion but also from science insofar as its main task is to provide human beings with a rational and immanent metaphysics, the distinction from religion becomes much more complicated. In my paper I will analyze these complications touching more general questions regarding the relation between mythological and logical truth.

Paradox and Human Flourishing:
The Special Case in Ecclesiastes

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Central to Christian theology are certain paradoxical claims attributed to Christ, such as "whoever will lose his life for my sake will save it" (Luke 9:24). Such paradoxical sayings are often interpreted this way: what is lost are worldly goods and what is saved are goods of the spiritual realm, and the spiritual realm is incommensurably greater than the earthly realm. But then how are human beings to live in this world?

The biblical book most focused on this question is the book of Ecclesiastes. One recurrent theme of the book is that everything human beings care about is just vanity. But Ecclesiastes also recurrently recommends joy in the small goods of everyday life. What is notable about the paradoxical character of the combined claims in Ecclesiastes is that they cannot be reconciled in the way that the paradoxical sayings of Christ are. The realm in which a person can be rejoice in the small goods of his day is apparently the same realm as the one in which everything is vanity.

In this paper, I explore the way in which the paradoxical character of the themes of Ecclesiastes are resolved to give a particular view of the good for human life.

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How to determine the metaphysical modality of theological propositions

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The modality of an alethic proposition is its possibility, impossibility, or necessity. Before the work of Kripke and Putnam in the 1960s, it was believed that the only kind of necessity or impossibility stronger than physical necessity or possibility is logical (to includeconceptual) necessity or impossibility; and so the only kind of possibility weaker than physical possibility is logical possibility. Since then it has been generally believed that there is a kind of metaphysical modality, such that while all logically necessary/impossiblepropositions are metaphysically necessary/impossible, many other propositions (especially a posteriori ones) are also metaphysically necessary/impossible; and so that there are logically possible propositions which are not metaphysically possible. This has led to a number of different theories of the nature of metaphysical modality, and how we can show that a proposition is or is not metaphysically possible (or whatever). In this paper I develop from the work of David Chalmers, a version of "conceivability" theory, and I apply it to considering how we can prove or disprove a claim that some theological proposition is metaphysically necessary (or whatever). I take as examples for consideration, the claim that "God is a (logically or metaphysically) necessary being" and the claim that "God foreknows all future free human choices."

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How to Merge the Anselmian and Cartesian Ontological Arguments. New Formalized Synthesis

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The arguments for the existence of God given by Anselm in "Proslogion" and Descartes in the "Meditations" attempt to justify the thesis on the existence of God on the basis of a properly formulated definition of God. In both cases, God is defined as the one who is the most perfect and who also has the 'supreme perfection': existence. In general, being a maximal element in the field of the ordering relation of *being more perfect than* is not equivalent to having some special attribute: 'supreme perfection'. Leibniz's revision of Descartes' argument reveals a new way of defining God as the subject of all perfections. Perfections should be understood, following Leibniz, as those attributes which "increase" the reality of individuals or are the maximal "stages" of this increasing. Every perfection is positive and this aspect of perfection is considered by K. Goedel in "Ontologisher Beweis". In this case, we are dealing with God as the subject of all positive properties. In Goedel's theory, however, the concept of positivity is not entangled in any specific relations between individuals, and this is an important component of Leibniz's idea, which in this respect refers to Anselm's argument. It is in Anselm's argument that a certain relational structure of individuals is used, which is generated by the relation of *being more perfect than*. In the proposed paper we will show how the concept of being positive can be related to the Leibnizian concept of perfection, taking into account the relational nature of God's attributes. As a result, we will obtain a theory in which we will implement Goedel's approach and at the same time enrich its original concept of positivity by referring to the relational concept of *being more perfect than*, which concept has an Anselmian origin. The resulting theory is a second order theory based on S5 logic. We give axiomatics and a model for it showing its consistency.

Logical Steps to Moksha according to Jainism

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In this study, we focus on Jainism, which has a privileged place in the history of Indian philosophical thought, especially in terms of its applications related to logic. The main reason why we say that they have a privileged structure in terms of their works is that they resorted to a different reasoning model than other systems thinkers in terms of revealing and proving correct information. This model, which in English is often called the seven-fold inference method, is called **Sabtabhanginaya** and **Syadvada**. The most important feature of this reasoning for our study is that it is not independent of the metaphysical views of Jain thinkers and believers. To put it in a summative way; Jain thinkers have concentrated on their epistemological studies that support their ontological assumptions.

They focus on the acquisition and sources of knowledge, the nature of knowledge, reliability of knowledge, and types of knowledge. Jains put forward their conceptions of the universe, accompanied by their metaphysical views supported by them. According to Jain thinkers, no doctrine (principle) can be devoid of reasoning in terms of establishing cause-effect relationships. Like that, Jain thinkers who have reinforced their metaphysical insights with the idea of **samsara** (rebirth), have holistically revealed all cognitive steps of existence forms within their systems, including **moksha** itself, which expresses liberation from the cycle of rebirth.

As a matter of fact, what we want to do with this study is to fist introduce the Jain system of thought in terms of its general structure in line with its metaphysical understandings that display an ontological, epistemological and logical integrity, and then to show which level of cognition corresponds to moksha, which is the cornerstone of Jain teaching.

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The Difference in the Creation Principle Between Islamic Religion and Greek Mythology and its Impact on the Relationship between Arabic Logic and Aristotelian Logic

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The logical principles are resulted from logicalizing the metaphysical first principles, which in turn are emerged from conceptualizing the mythological principles, particularly the principle of creation in the creation myth. Therefore, a different principle of creation could lead to different ways of thinking or different logics. The principle of creation myth in Greek creation myth is the exclusion principle, as creation is to order the eternal discorded existence, i.e., chaos, through separation between contradictories according to the principle of exclusion. Which is represented through the principles of non-contradiction and excluded- middle, upon which the dominant bivalent western metaphysics and logic are founded. On the other hand, the creation myth in Abrahamic religions relies on totally different principle. It is founded upon ultimate power, which in turn is founded upon ultimate will, which brings nothingness into being according merel y to the ultimate creator's will rather than any defined rule or logos. Therefore, there was a great opportunity to surpass any limitations or fundamental principles of any established intellectual system. The

main concern of this paper is to explore the extent to which the difference in creation principles between Islam and Greek thought impacts the relationship between Arabic logic in the mediaeval era and Aristotelian logic. We argue in this paper that such a difference in creation principles led the Islamic thinker to interact with Aristotelian logic in two different manners: Rejecting Aristotelian logic as it represents rigid, absolute logos, whereas god's will or ultimate divine will has to surpass any such logos, and shouldn't be limited to any given principles or fundamental axioms; it represents the absolute possibilities in terms of logic. Adopting the Aristotelian logic and its main principle, i.e. exclusion principle, which represents the Greek logos, while implicitly surpassing such a principle within the logical practice, for instance, Al-Faribi in his interpretation of the future sea battle example in Aristotle's book On Interpretation, in chapter nine and Avicenna "Ibn Sina" in his ontological argument for the existence of god.

Marguerite Porete on the Dualism of Good and Evil

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According to Bertrand Russell, one of the four tenets of mystical thinking lies in the rejection of the boundaries between good and evil, according to which all evil is regarded as illusory, and the true Reality — as good. For the mystic, the experiential distinction between "lower" good and evil applies only to the world of illusion, whereas the "higher" good — which is free from all evil — belongs to Reality. The reason for this is that any feeling of the dualism of good and evil demands some kind of activity in the practical world, which is not required by the contemplative existence carried out in the theoretical world, allowing impartiality and overcoming this ethical dualism. Importantly, Russell constructs his wider definition of mysticism based on the ideas of classical philosophers, such as Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, rather than thinkers traditionally perceived as mystics. To apply it to such thinkers seems therefore an interesting and much-needed task. The purpose of my talk is to employ Russell's idea of the mystical rejection of ethical dualism to the thought of Marguerite Porete, a late medieval French mystic and author of *The Mirror of Simple and Annihilated Souls* — a theological treatise written as a dialogue between the Soul, Love, and Reason.

On the general, universal level, Porete affirms the existence of ethical dualism, and does so mainly by juxtaposing the goodness of the divine with the wickedness of

the human. Importantly, she translates this axiology into a metaphysical stance that goodness is being, and wretchedness is nothing. On the other hand, her idea that all earthly labours are to be directed at satisfying the desires of the divine suggests an imperative according to which good Christians should be focused on always performing good works, yet this is not the case: that focus should be transferred from performing specific acts of religious devotion or charity — which require a certain activity in the world, as Russell also emphasises — to achieving a full epistemological and ontological union with the divine through contemplation and, ultimately, surrender of the self. Against the background of Divine Love, all of Soul's deeds are ultimately inconsequential and have no bearing whatsoever on her standing, no matter their nature. This is why once she is perfectly simple, the Soul is no longer concerned with neither the character of her actions nor her status in the society that she is no longer a part of, but rather fully immerses herself in selflessness. This suggests that ultimately, Porete was convinced that the boundaries between good and evil are indeed illusory, as Russell would have us believe in the context of mystical discourse. Indeed, the Soul seems to be beyond the worldly good and evil, but much rather in the Stoic than the Nietzschean sense: she "has her peace in all places, for she carries peace with her always, so that, because of such peace, all places are comfortable for her, and all things also".

Graceful Integration of the Finite with the Infinite of Heavens

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At the end the 19th century, Georg Cantor (a religious man) formulated a set theory able to expand the borders of mathematics and to define the concept of infinity; in his view, the infinite belonged uniquely to God. Cantor played a crucial role in creating set theory. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) is today the standard axiomatic theory considered as the most common foundation of mathematics. The original axiomatization of set theory given by Zermelo in 1908 included atoms; atoms may be members of sets, but are not made up of other elements. In mathematics, this axiomatic set theory with atoms (denoted shortly ZFA) is a natural adjustment of ZF.

Fraenkel and Mostowski constructed models of ZFA by using a group of permutations of the atoms to show the independence of the axiom of choice. ZFA and ZF are equivalent; the results of ZFA can be translated into ZF, and vice-versa.

Philosophers use ZFA to reason about the ontology of the real world in which atoms are supposed to be the existing material things. Aiming to integrate harmoniously the finite with the infinite in the same consistent mathematics, we extend ZFA with a single axiom saying that the system works only with 'finitely supported sets'. Essentially, for each infinite set only a finite set of its atoms (its finite support) is significant. A set (possibly infinite) is 'finitely supported' if, up to permutations of the underlying structure of atoms, it has only finitely many elements.

The axioms of this new set theory are exactly the axioms of ZFA (including the axiom of infinity) extended with a special 'finite support' axiom. The new axiom extends (but not deny) the classic ones. Since we have an additional axiom, it is possible to have less theorems than in the classic set theory. Beneficially, most of the important ZF results are valid for finitely supported sets. However, some results are no longer valid in this new framework. Fortunately, the axiom of choice (generating a large amount of controversy in classic mathematics; Banach-Tarski paradox is one of its non-intuitive consequence) together with other choice principles are not valid in this new set theory. Thus, we can say that we get a better mathematics, a graceful integration of the finite with the infinite of heavens. More technical details are presented in the book A. Alexandru, G. Ciobanu. *Foundations of Finitely Supported Structures: A Set Theoretical Viewpoint,* Springer, 2020.

Ontological Arguments Derived from Accelerating Turing Machines: A Logical Approach

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The study of Turing Accelerating Machines (ATMs) has generated a series of paradoxes that have questioned, indistinctly and often intermingled in the scientific literature, their possible existence as mathematical formalisms and as computationally implementable devices. After briefly ordering the main paradoxes, we can conclude that, thanks to the developments of Hamkins (2002), Steinhart (2007) or Shagrir

(2007) among others, we can formally define from a rigorous perspective what an ATM is in the strict sense and how it is possible as a non-inconsistent and self-contradictory formalism.

In this sense, what remains is to study its possible physical implementations, but in this process two types of discussions arise: (i) about the exotic physical conditions that would have to be met for an ATM to be implemented as such and (ii) a series of ontological arguments qualitatively different from the classical arguments San Anselm, Gödel, Plantinga, ...? that we will expose and analysed in terms of their correct logical-formal definition and, above all, their possible limits. For the latter I will use the normal modal first order logic.

From Steinhart (2003), among others, we will see the viability or unfeasibility of these arguments and, above all, the philosophical and logical repercussions they will have.

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On the Mortality of the Gods and the Immortality of Humans

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Since early antiquity, the idea of opposing mortal humans to immortal gods has become so ingrained in the mythological and poetic tradition that any attempt to doubt it seemed blasphemous. For Homer, the concepts of "mortal" and "immortal" were not only attributes of humans and gods, respectively but were also used as their synonyms. Pindar distinguished three categories of beings: gods, men and heroes, insisting on the impossibility of mixing them.

Inmodern times, the poles of this dichotomy have been interchanged when F. Nietzsche declared the "death of God". In contrast, in the philosophy of Russian cosmism (Tsiolkovsky, Vernadsky, Fedorov), the idea of the physical immortality of humans is supported by rational scientific arguments. However, this idea is not entirely new.

Already in ancient thought, in parallel with the central concept of the immortality of the gods and the mortality of humans, a wide variety of concepts has been developed about the possibilities for the death of a god, the immortality of humans, intermediate states between mortality and immortality and between the gods and the humans.

Specific forms of the death of a god, in addition to physical elimination, could be the loss of physical strength and power, the refusal or loss of control over the world, or the lack of influence on humans. The forms of human immortality can be considered the ability to continue to exist after death in Hades, the ability to leave Hades (Hercules, Theseus, and Sisyphus); the presence of an immortal soul (Socrates, Plato); endless bodily rebirth (Pythagoras, Empedocles). In early Greek philosophy, we find numerous examples of the intention to bring human and divine essences closer together (Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Empedocles).

In antiquity, neither mortality nor immortality was considered an absolute state, whereas, in modern times, a contrary view was held. Consequently, traditional binary logic is inadequate for examining the problem of immortality and mortality of gods and humans; a different non-binary logic tolerant to contradiction is required.

20 Particles and Their Mother

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This paper has three main points. First, it tries to offer a new argument that (standard interpretations of) Hume's and Russell's critiques fail to disprove the cosmological argument. The version of the argument that these critiques attack is usually called 'Leibnitz-Clark' proof. As my second point I will offer a new similar version of the proof, which has the principle of sufficient reason as its only metaphysical assumption. I will argue that this version is also immune to Hume's and Russell's

critiques. On the other hand, that version has less theological importance than the original arguments by Clark and Leibniz. While the first two points are relevant for the logical analysis of the cosmological argument, the third point is mainly important for the history of philosophy. I will argue that the standard interpretation of Hume's critique cannot be ascribed to Hume, that it contradicts not only his other writings, but also the very same page from his *Dialogues* on which the standard interpretation is based. I will also argue that Russell's critique is not much more than a careful reading of Hume.

The version of the cosmological argument that I will deal with here is sometimes called 'typical XVIII-century' or 'Leibnitz-Clark' argument. This is an atemporal argument relying heavily on the principle of sufficient reason. The main characteristics that differentiate this and the 'typical XIII-century' (Aquinas') versionare: first, the factual premise is simply that something exists, without requiring anything else (while Aquinas's 'factual' premises have heavy metaphysical baggage); second, no appealing to the alleged impossibility of infinite regresses. Here is the basic form of the XVIII-century argument:

(1)	Every being is either dependent or self-existing	*First Premise*
(2)	Not every being can be a dependent being	*Second Premise*
(3)	Therefore, there exist a self-existing being	*Conclusion*

The main task is to prove the second premise. It is usually done via *reductio*: if all beings were dependent, then the world or the whole of beings would not have its cause nor explanation why it is the way it is and not different, contrary to the principle of sufficient reason. Hume's and Russell's critiques, as standardly interpreted, attack different steps in this reasoning. I will analyze the proof, the critiques, thenRowe's and Pruss's refutations of the 'Hume' criticism, and offer another refutation. I will argue that standard interpretation of Hume's critique, were it right, would have much more devastating consequences beside refuting the cosmological argument. Among others, it implies the impossibility of theism and deism, and many states of affairs that have traditionally been considered possible.

The Advaitic God: Subservient to the Self?

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This paper explores the implications of God in post scholastic Advaita that used the techniques of the neo-logical navya nyāya school of philosophy. For Śaṅkara (early Advaita), God must necessarily be conscious. The world of name (nāma) and form (rūpa), which for Advaita is the ontological definition of objects of perception, are the limiting adjunct (upādhi/paricāyaka) of the self. Absolute truth for Advaita, is realization of the true self that self validates itself (svaprakāśa) and is proof-independent. For Advaita, one who has not realized the truth (true self), study of Vedas are useless, and Vedas are equally useless for the realized. This Self-realization does not depend on sense perception and is therefore not an object of perception. Therefore the role of the Advaitic God is the cause of the world but not our self (ātma). On an ontological footing, Advaita considers this world as logically neither true nor false and thus indeterminate (māyā). This argument of Advaita using the Navya nyāya logical framework is analyzed. Perception, which is a valid means of knowledge in Advaita, is of two types when seen from the perspective of a witness (sākṣī). While witness for the individual self is consciousness that has the mind (buddhi) as its limiting adjunct (upādhi/paricāyaka), witness for God is consciousness that has māyā as its limiting adjunct. The logical assumption is the ability to distinguish between qualifying attribute (viśeṣaṇa) and limiting adjunct. A qualifying attribute has to be in a relation with the object qualified, either through contact, inherence or self-linking relation. However, limiting adjuncts allows us to differentiate without the need of such relations. God is then defined as consciousness limited by māyā. This paper explores how the Advaitic God is not necessary in every possible world. As long as the buddhi (jnāna) operates and qualified cognitions (viśiṣṭajnāna) are obtained for the epistemic agent, God's role is justified. If one perceives the world as indeterminate, they are the witness of God and once there is self-knowledge (ātmajnāna), it asks if God's role becomes redundant.

Purely Formal Apocalypses?

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Some texts use symbolic language, myths, embedding analogies between operations, to understand, for example the birth of the earth and the heaven (*toledot*, Genèse 1), or the fact they disappear. Other biblical texts, as apocalypse, describe the beginning and the end of a given universe. What about the text as an object? semiotic and analogical, but also logical and algebraic? Can we consider it as a series of combinations, and operations on some sorts or categories of thoughts, of transformations such as those manipulated by Combinatory Logic (LC) from H. Curry (1958)? LC uses a simple symbolism to compose and transform operators, by the application of an operator to an operand, and as such is called "Purely formal" or "Applicative only", as a logic of fundamental operations (Desclés&*al*. 2015, 2016).

In that picture, what are the "operators" of the text, without entering *de facto* a domain of interpretation? LC can be expressed through isomorphic algebraic "*treilles*" structures or bi-ordered computer trees to compose sorts as for example abstract places and transformations of these places or operators. Is a branch substitutable to another, as types, under which conditions? Can a formalism help to discover some intention of the text, a first thought or concept, beyond some understandings in defined times and places? Can the vocabulary be a clue or even a key to enter the categories, as the dragon or *kategor* accuses? Ancient texts use images, a semiotic construction. We compare and investigate the symbolic language and system, starting with that of Curry, sorts and operators. Based on linguistic methods, in particular for the analysis of markers (places, not only), we will highlight the functioning: Is the text really a formal system? Does it exhaust neither the method nor the possible interpretations? More over, can it be illogical?

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Anselm's Ontological Argument Reconsidered As a Religious Thought Experiment

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In this contribution Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God is identified, analyzed, and interpreted as a religious thought experiment (RTE).

First, some characteristics of RTE (as proofs of God's existence and miracles) are introduced, and applied to the ontological proof. Second, recent discussions on St.Anselm's proof are critically adjudicated by means of various TE-analyses. Third, it is concluded that the logical-empiricist analyses may be accused of a confusion of the natural and the supernatural: They try to prove too much, i.e. the referent instead of the meaning of God.

The RTE account consists of two parts--1st Bochenski's notion of supernatural verification is introduced to describe religious experiences of believers; 2nd on basis of a close analysis of St. Anselm's original Latin text we propose some indications for higher order predicate logical or modal logical analyses of the ontological argument (e.g. ∀w ||- [ ] E(g)) that can render it valid and □ sound as a proof of God's existence. Finally, Anselm's Ontological argument is compared to Ibn Sina's Flying Man and Siddhartha Gautama's Vipassana Meditation.

Al Shahrastani's Criticism of Ibn Sina'a Metaphysics

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Ibn Sina is known to be one of the most influential Muslim philosophers in his contribution to Islamic civilization. He wrote several groundbreaking works and laid the foundation in metaphysical discussions, especially regarding the concept of existence and its division. However, Mutakallimun such as Muhammad bin Abdul Karim al Shahrastani through his book *Kitab Musara'a al-Falasifah,* detected some weaknesses in Ibn Sina's arguments and explanations regarding the concept of existence and its

division. Most scholars believe that he is an Isma'ili because this book represents the ideas of Isma'ili in his arguments when criticizing Ibn Sina. However, this paper does not agree with this statement because not all of his arguments are based on Isma'ili ideas. Based on the study towards the The Second Issue in *Kitab Musara'a al-Falasifah* which is 'On the Existence of the Necessary Existence,' it is find that only the concept of nature of God is based on Isma'ili ideas while for the distinction between generality and specificity, God's omnipotence and God's will, it is based on the Ash'ari framework. Therefore, this paper demonstrates that al Shahrastani is a Sunni scholar who has an Isma'ili philosophical understanding on the nature of God based on historical evidence and argumentative evidence.

The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics: its Meaning and Relevance for Religious Life

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"*Why is there something rather than nothing*?" (call it Q) has been called the fundamental question of metaphysics. In this paper, we intend to do two things. First, we want to defend Q from charges of meaninglessness by giving a modal interpretation to one of the terms used therein, ie; *nothing*. if this interpretation is accepted, Q does seem to have an answer albeit not very informative apparently. We argue that the answer for Q depends on how we answer another connected question "Could there have been nothing?". An answer in the negative gives a kind of answer that can be understood through an analogy to a proof famous in mathematics called proof by *reductio ad absurdum*. In such proofs, we can know the answer but not why the answer is true. (The proof that the square root of 2 is irrational, for example is a *reductio* argument). We contend that this move also offers insight into the debates between certain modern cosmologists and philosophers of science like the famous Krauss-Albert debate and also the debates post '*The Grand Design*' by Stephen Hawking.

In the second part of the paper, we argue that thus understood, Q can provide a basis for a sustained quest for a search for meaning of life and purpose. We look at the question from a unique perspective, that of answering Camus' question on suicide. We explore the interconnections of the absurd, meaning and suicide from the perspective of Q and its suggested answer.

Science or Religion? — Similitudes and Dissimilitudes

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The scientific revolution in the XVI–XVII century was, among other things, a rupture with the (catholic) church and its dogmatic control of what Nature is and what could be thought about it. Religious dogmas and beliefs result from purely mental, sentimental, and meta-mental activities while one hallmark in this splitting process was the consideration of observing Nature as a dispute solver for our scientific speculations. Despite that, Science, as a search to understand Nature, has always been considered a monastic activity [Mayr, 1997].

In addition, after running the scientific enterprise for about 400 years, there are explicit and implicit dogmas and beliefs in it, like the Central Dogma in Biology; or the belief in nature being, despite the windows resulting from the way our acquired knowledge casts what we perceive, observe, and consider important. Furthermore, the scientific milieu [Vieira Kritz, 2022] itself has several mechanisms that control what is acceptable science and decree what are the "good" directions for research.

How these characteristics compare to religious dogmas, beliefs, and indexes? Where do these homologous and recurrent behaviour originate? Are they a consequence of biology and brain physiology? Of social and psychological archetypes? Of resonances in behaviour or subliminal human-interaction traits that permeate all cultures? More importantly, how can we become conscious of this prison, overcome its fences, and become effectively creative free thinkers able to re-think our world in a completely up-side-down way and solve our present survival challenges? Religion focuses on the survival of the soul, while science on survival of Humanity. Can any

soul survive if Humanity doesn't? Should not Science and Religion work together instead of disputing about precedences?

This discussion and thought-experiments are incidental to a larger effort to understand the scientific milieu and why it so often fails to live for what it preaches concerning multi-disciplinary research about complex phenomena, particularly those threatening Humanity. This is not a theologically oriented effort, though. One may think of it at most as "applied teleology." This endeavour uses a non-trivial amount of available empirical and non-empirical scientific knowledge to pin things down, identifying our mental processes and their traps; particularly, knowledge akin to systems science, anticipation, and cognitive sciences. It strives to investigate science in an integrative way, embracing its ethereal, romantic, intellectual, and pragmatic sides.

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The Privation Theory of Evil and Logical Realism: How Things Really "Are" when they "Are" in Privation of Something?

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As it is well known, evil is incompatible with the typical theistic set of beliefs. Omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God as the ultimate ground of everything cannot coexist with such a thing as evil. But then again, it seems hard to deny that there is evil: any human and animal suffering may be counted as instances of some moral or natural evil.

Expectedly, in addressing the perennial '*unde malum*?' challenge, various strategies have been developed by philosophers and theologians in the hope of reconciling the datum of evil with the concept of the so-called Omni God. One such strategy is the

privation theory of evil. In short, an advocate of this theory claims that evil is mere privation, i.e. the absence of good or simply a lack of good in some particular nature.

In this talk, I argue that the privation theory does not deliver what it promises: it does not explain how something that is allegedly negative, or at least an absence or lack of something positive (i.e. good) can becausally efficient. In fact, a typical response to the privation theory is thatthere are positive instances of evil (i.e. pain). But I insist that the very distinction between positive and negative is suspicious in the first place. Still, even if we admit privations into our metaphysics, I suggest that the only way to successfully explain the incompatibility of the sentences signifying some *having* and some *lacking* is to endorse the principle of contraries. Such a principle, however, is not a logical principle yet a metaphysical one saying in the most general sense how things can and cannot *be*.

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The Problem of Future Contingents and Divine Foreknowledge in John Aurifaber

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The issue concerning the truth-value of future contingent propositions certainly ranks among the most challenging problems in the history of logic. In Chapter 9 of *De interpretatione*, Aristotle stressed that they cannot be treated in the same way as other types of propositions, since the possibility of identifying future contingent propositions in advance as necessarily true or necessarily false would open the door to Stoic fatalism. Putting forward an example that will become famous, Aristotle states

that of a hypothetical sea battle that might take place tomorrow, one can simply say that it is necessary that it will happen or it will not happen; but neither alternative can prevail *ex ante* over the other.

In the Middle Ages, this issue is further complicated by two reasons:

1) the peculiar interpretation that Severinus Boethius gave of Chapter 9 of *De interpretatione*. According to Boethius, in fact, Aristotle asserted that future contingent propositions are not "definitely" true or false. With this addition, the attention of medieval authors will at some point turn to the exact way of understanding the "indeterminacy" of the truth value of certain statements;

2) the indeclinable assumption of God's foreknowledge, which seems to make necessary the future events He foresees, and hence the propositions that describe them.

The aim of my talk is to shed light on the interesting solutions given to these problems by John Aurifaber, a master of arts active in the 14th century in the German city of Erfurt. Specifically, I focus on qq. 9 and 10 of his commentary on Book II of Aristotle's *Physics*, concerning respectively the "determinacy" of the truth-value of future contingent propositions and the necessity of future events. In q. 9, Aurifaber departs from those who hold that the "indeterminacy" of future contingent propositions depends on an epistemic incapacity of the creature, which can be overcome by divine revelation. Rather, he puts forth the view that future contingent propositions cannot be determinately true even for God Himself, a point that demonstrates a quite different understanding of divine foreknowledge from that of authors such as Thomas Aquinas and Boethius. Regarding q. 10, Aurifaber's solution revolves entirely around the very definition of '*futurum*', which can only be considered as such if it is something that is not yet, but will be; it is in fact established *ab aeterno* in its happening. In this way, the author manages to keep divine foreknowledge within his system in an almost unproblematic manner, since it does not change what is already implied in the premises. Nevertheless, Aurifaber distances himself from theological fatalism and attempts to recover a form of compatibilism, shifting the focus from the necessary realisation of all futures to the "necessary" or "contingent" ways in which a given event is fixed as a future.

Concatenation of Logics and Aesthetics in the Flow of the Experience of the Sacred in the Thought of Abhinavagupta, 950-1016, on the example of *Abhinavabharati*. A study into comparative aesthetics

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The aim of my study is to prove that seemingly intangible character of the aesthetic experience, doomed to be extremely subjective and ungraspable, can be analysed in the line of the logical thinking which pursues in itself some cognitive linking between things and phenomena. This is being done in the frame of the Indian tradition that deals with aesthetic experience as presented in the sixth book of *the Natya Shastra*. However I will be mostly referring to *Abhinavabharati* which is the tenth century commentary by Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri logician, on the theory of rasa,रस. The term literally means "a liquid, an extract and flavour nectar, essence, taste" while in an aesthetic sense it is a cognitive-emotional process that goes far beyond the European concept of a mere aesthetic experience for it lifts and transports the spectators towards the expression of ultimate reality and transcendent values. Accordingly, it combines a pure aesthetic pleasure with entertainment, katharsis, learning and the feeling of sacred. Susan L. Schwarz suggests rasa might be a taste of things to come in the performance of the divine.1

In particular I will be justifying the premise of my research through analysis of the ninth rasa, called śanta -rasa, शान्ति रस , which is a kind of the aesthetic experience tantamount to the state of personal peace. It was Abhinavagupta himself who extended eight original rasas discussed in the *Natya Shastra* by adding to them a crown of the all rasas which is peace or tranquillity.

Methodology

A Sanskrit term Shanti or Śanti both in Hindu and Buddhist meditative practices is chanted three times to evoke threefold peace in body, mind and spirit. In the Shivaic philosophy the term is referring as well to 'expelling evil". The methodological shift from linguistics to phenomeono- logical aesthetics as advocated by Roman Ingarden, will allow to structure the flow of one's aesthetic experience as such and to define

its ontological parameters. Furthermore, the analytical tools of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology provide adequate terminology describing the human emotions related to experience of Shanti or Śanti, ensuing from contemplation of harmony, symmetry and eurythmy. The reference to the Ancient Greece aesthetics will lend itself to a complex and interdisciplinary research strategy that would justify implementation of logical approach to measuring psychophysiological data underlying śanta -rasa, शान्ति रस.

Results

In the Holy Scripture, be it the Vedas or the Bible, the term peace tends to be equipollent with the sacred, thus aesthetic experience of peace or tranquillity might induce the flow of the experience of the divine character that can assume in turn a transformational character with a significant impact on the human being. Therefore the realm of the mundane can turn into recognition of the divine reality beyond the realm of ordinary perception. In consequence, the language of logics can trace and explain interlinked conditions of the overall process triggered by man's encounter with a piece of art, regardless its medium.

The Emptiness of Seven

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The biblical story that God created the world in just seven days has been very influential. It may be related to the seven days of the week. The *incongruity of week and year* has bothered the author since schooldays. It is ultimately due to the fact that 7 does *not* divide 365. We are concerned with a number-theoretic issue. Obviously, the number of whole days of the year is divisible by 5. So 73 *Buchholz weeks* with 5 days each synchronize week and year. Since weeks with 73 days are out of question and 73 is a prime number as well, *this is the only way*. However, there are 5 *arithmetical* or *Buchholz seasons*. Intercalary days remain necessary and must not belong to any week. They might become "cosmic holidays".

Unlike month and other human settings, earth year and day are given naturally, presupposing the existence of the sun, its light, and the earth (with the moon), orbiting the sun and self-rotating, which causes the change of day and night time.

The unit of sunrise, daytime, sunset, dusk, night, and dawn determines the day (in one place) in a most natural, qualitative manner, coinciding with the period from one sunrise to the next.

What about *working weeks*? We found astounding analogies. A 3.5-day work week corresponds to the 5-day work week, since 3.5 ÷ 5 ? 5 ÷ 7. An equivalent distribution is: 4-1–3-2. Compared to the 6/7 work week, a 4/5 work week leads to some relief. Recently, a 4-day work week has been discussed: Here, the 3/5 work week would correspond, since 3 ÷ 5 ? 4 ÷7.

With our *light seasons*, the solstices and equinoxes are *midpoints*, not starting points.

As is well-known, the statements of the hexaemeron are not in accordance with science. The creation of the world has taken *billions of years*.

The Dialectic of *Maya* as Transcending Trivalent logic (*Sadasadvilakshana*)

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In a time when pluralistic logic reigns supreme it would be interesting to get to know some ancient attempts from the oriental traditions along these lines, the attempts in which Logic and Religion join hands as allies to account for certain ontological entities that transcend the empirical reality bounded by the binary system. Advaita Vedanta, a philosophical system propounded by Acharya Sankara brings in a concept called *Maya* within the ontological sphere of the system of Vedanta. This is a principle which functions as the root cause of the phenomenal experience of the individual, the basic ignorance, which is not ontologically distinct from the Absolute reality, namely Brahman, but nevertheless, functions as the cause for the experience of a plural world hiding the unitary nature of reality, which is of the nature of pure consciousness. The principle of *Maya* thus accounts for the concealing of the true nature of reality *(avarana)* and also projects a false world of plurality before the phenomenal being *(vikshepa)*. In other words, the experience of this apparently real world is due to the functioning of *Maya / Avidya* both at the individual level and at the trans individual level. Interestingly this principle has been given a peculiar logical / ontological status, as one that transcends the three possible logical positions: truth, falsity, and a

combination of both truth and falsity. To establish this thesis Advaitins make use of a prevailing doctrine called *catushkoti* used by the Madhyamaka Bauddhas to explicate how *Sunya* transcends the four logical quarters. Nagarjuna in his *Mulamadhyamaka Karika* brings in this principle of *catuṣkoṭi* in order to define the nature of *Sunya*, the absolute reality*.* Countering the principle of *tertium non datur* that everything is either true, or false, *catuskoti* speaks of four mutually exclusive possibilities for any proposition: Either

- (1)   it holds,
- (2)   it does not hold,
- (3)   it both holds and does not hold,
- (4)   it neither holds nor does not hold – the four corners, which reality transcends.

Using this verry same principle of *catushkoti* propounded by Nagarjuna, Sankara argues that *Maya,* the principle he proposed to account for the empirical world logically / ontologically occupies the fourth possibility, namely, neither true nor false (*sadasadvilakshana*). The Siddhi literature of the post Sankara Advaita (particularly the *Ishtasiddhi* and the *Advaita siddhi*) speaks vividly about the peculiar logical status the principle of *maya* holds, as one neither true nor false, nor a combination of both. The later Advaitins also pronounce that the release from this primal ignorance (*avidyanivrtti*) will amount to the attainment of an ontological state, where the individual transcends all the four possible quarters of logic (*catushkoti vinirmukta*). The paper would critically examine the establishment of Maya/ avidya in the Siddhi literature, borrowing arguments from Vedantadesika, a 14th century Visistadvaitin.

Heinrich Scholz' Theory of Possible Worlds Reconsidered

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Heinrich Scholz (1884-1956) put forward a variant of neo-empiricsm, the so-called scientific metaphysics (Peckhaus 2022). Neo-positivist in nature, Scholz's research program called for the axiomatization and formalization of theories – as both the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group for Empirical Philosophy did. In contrast to the

other neo-positivists, Scholz went further: he argued for an equal treatment of the metaphysical underpinnings of a science and of the theories they contain. The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the notion of metaphysics as we find it in Scholz, in particular with respect to its role in Scholz' work on formal logic. Moreover, the goal is to read these remarks both in the context of Scholz' six articles of faith (1942)—the "heuristic background" (Peckhaus 2008) of his remaining work—and his Philosophy of Religion (1921), and on the basis of unpublished works by Scholz that have not been translated into English so far.

Scholz, a German Protestant theologian, philosopher, and logician, strongly supported the early 20th century so-called "scientific philosophy" movement. He developed a comprehensive research program of axiomatization and formalization of theories, which, in contrast to the program of the Vienna Circle or the Berlin Group for Empirical Philosophy, also included a metaphysical foundation. While the history of logical positivism is mostly well-researched, little attention has been paid to Scholz and his program in the literature so far.

Concerning his metaphysics, Scholz, following Leibniz, takes a conception of possible worlds to be the starting point of his metaphysics. Possible (not necessarily actual) worlds constitute the logical frame for any description of the real world. He also introduces the term "Leibniz languages", which Peckhaus (2008) describes as "symbolic languages with exactly defined means of expression. Each expression is a finite string of characters using a given symbolism according to well-determined rules. If the means of expression are restricted in such a way that (1) these expressions always have sense, and (2) it is decidable whether the produced expressions are true in all possible worlds (universally valid, allgemeingültig), then L is called a "Universal Leibniz Language". A universally valid fundamental expression is called a Leibniz Theorem."

While the focus of this talk will lie on explaining Scholz's remarks about metaphysics and logic and the role that the formulation of a "Leibniz Language" plays for both, I will end by discussing Scholz' thoughts on the limits of knowledge, particularly as we find them in his six articles of faith (1942) – and also in his thoughts about the philosophy of religion, and so-far untranslated remarks such as his comment that "god is greater than our thoughts" (Meschkowski 1977, my translation, on the occasion of the Festschrift for his friend Karl Barth).

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Beauty Reveals Truth and Goodness

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In the Orthodox Christian understanding theosis can be said to be the purification of the image of God within every human being. This purification is done by aligning oneself with the center of unity, which is eventually God Himself. This alignment can be understood as a process of becoming: multiplicity is gathered towards a center of identity.

Beauty directs this becoming of being. There is no art for art's sake in the Eastern Orthodox understanding of aesthetics. Beauty is a way to direct people towards a focal point – the highest one being God who speaks everything into existence. On the level of worldviews the Logos is the self-referential final authority that provides epistemic justification for our logical and metalogical assertions.

This runs contrary to the more existentialist attitudes of art as self-expression. For Nietzsche, the true artist is free of all conformity and societal norms, and he forges a new path for himself. Beauty directs towards the overman that assumes the position of epistemic authority in a world of clashing wills.

Technological efficiency and thinking also has a distinct influence on our understanding of beauty. The amount of beauty can't be measured and thus it can't be given a quantifiable value, therefore its existence is not even offensive to technological thinking – it's meaningless.

To save beauty and properly understand the role of art, we must assert the truthfulness of Christian theism. It is more common to say that without God there would be no objective truth or morality, but without beauty we wouldn't see their instances as they are. The role of beauty is to show being as it is, which in turn is the prerequisite of knowing both truth and goodness.

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A Critique of Atheism Based on Divine Hiddenness

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Believers in monotheistic religions believe in a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and all- good, who is present in existence and oversees the ups and downs of their lives. But these same believers, from time to time, encounter the divine hiddenness and seem to realize the absence of God in the universe or His disregard for their own lives and those of other human beings. Some contemporary philosophers, including Schellenberg, have tried to deny the existence of a god of monotheistic religions by relying on divine hiddenness or to make the existence of such a god improbable. The present article, in a descriptive-analytical manner, examines two deductive and inductive arguments based on divine hiddenness and concludes that although divine hiddenness can challenge the religious beliefs of theists, but: First, the presupposition of divine hiddenness, is an unacceptable presupposition due to a kind of anthropomorphism, and also due to a misconception of how God is present and involved in nature and human life. The God of monotheistic religions is not a human-like being to expect human action and reaction from him. God is manifested in essence and hidden in essence, and some believers find the presence of God in their existence and life. Secondly, even assuming the divine hiddenness, the existence of the God of monotheistic religions cannot be denied or considered impossible; Because God can test the believers both by His appearance and by His hiding, and make their faith more complete and their religious experience richer.

Although divine hiddenness is an unjustified evil for theists, it cannot be logically concluded from divine hiddenness that there is no god or that

God isn't omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely good.

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Non-commutative Logic and Religious Intuition

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The goal of paper is to build extension of logic that model religious intuition. Our model is based on intuitive choices that historically forms the basis of intuition of universal order and is hardly formalizable. To address this problem we need to uncover the patterns in the preceding implicit learning. Since Bayesian decision-making and rational judgments do not necessarily prescribe the intuitive experiences of "knowing without knowing how one knows", for such aim we suggest to use the recently developed non-commutative multi-valued logic operating with the subjective trusts. In this logic, the consequences depend both on the truthfulness of the clauses and on their order, and "the level of non-commutativity" is defined according to humans' belief bias: people stronger believe to the statements that to certain events assign lower and higher chances, but weaker believe to the statements that to the same events assign intermediate chances. The resulting ordering of beliefs conforms to non-commutative logic and their non-distributivity. In the last section we discuss the relation between logical non-commutativity and religious intuition.

Contingent Identity: The Holy Trinity as Counterparts of God

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Many people in Christian tradition say that the Holy Trinity is God himself. But God is one, while the Holy Trinity is three – i.e. (a) the Father, (b) the Son and (c) the Holy Spirit. We could take this statement and postulate an identity – as a bundle of properties in leibnizian sense – between them; however they would be just one, not three. Nonetheless, we surely do not say that the Father is the same as the Son or the Holy Spirit. They are separately three, not just one. In the other hand, we surely take them to be one, i.e. God. Thus, we have two alternatives: (1) assuming that God

is contradictory, or (2) postulating a counterpart theory to lead with this issue. In this case, I will choose the second option. Hence, the purpose of my talk is to avoid the idea that God is contradictory and use a counterpart to deal with it.

Roughly, a counterpart relation is a relation of similarity: a counterpart of *S* from the world *W*α can be defined as the object that most closely resembles *S* in another possible world *W*β. Furthermore, those relations are not necessarily symmetric and transitive. Hence, we can say that God is both the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, even though these three things are not identical. They are counterparts of each other: (a) is a counterpart of (b) and (c), (b) is a counterpart of (a) and (c), (c) is a counterpart of (a) and (b); but they are different individuals. They are related with one individual, i.e. God. Then, we have to deny the necessity of identity in favor of a contingent identity theory, because they will not be the same in all cases. Therefore, I will investigate which account of contingent identity explained by Ramachandran (1990), applied to counterpart theory, is the best candidate to contemplate this issue in the christian religious studies.

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Exploring Logic in Jainism

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Jainism, an ancient Indian religious and philosophical tradition, encompasses profound intellectual and spiritual insights. Central to Jain philosophy are two key branches of study: Tark Bhasha (the language of logic) and Pramanmimansha (the theory of valid cognition).

We will delve into the essence and significance of Jain Tark Bhasha and Praman-mimansha, shedding light on their principles and contributions to Jain philosophical thought.

Jain Tark Bhasha is a systematic approach to reasoning and logical analysis within the Jain tradition. It provides a framework for critical thinking, debate, and logical inference, enabling scholars to explore and comprehend complex philosophical concepts. It encompasses various logical tools and techniques, such as syllogism, classification, and refutation, to engage in rigorous intellectual discourse and arrive at sound conclusions. Jains employs it to refine their understanding of the nature of reality, the self, and the ultimate truths of existence.

Pramanmimansha, on the other hand, focuses on the theory of valid cognition or epistemology. It examines the ways in which knowledge is acquired, validated, and categorized in Jain philosophy. It investigates the sources of knowledge (pramanas) and the different categories of knowledge (prameyas), emphasizing a comprehensive understanding of reality. Jain thinkers meticulously examine perception, inference, testimony, comparison, and non-perception as means to ascertain the validity and reliability of knowledge, establishing the reliability of knowledge claims and discerning the true nature of reality.

The combination of Jain Tark Bhasha and Pramanmimansha forms a robust framework for intellectual inquiry and philosophical analysis within Jainism. These disciplines contribute to the development of a logical and coherent worldview, enabling Jains to engage with complex philosophical questions and arrive at well-founded beliefs. Furthermore, the study of Tark Bhasha and Pramanmimansha cultivates critical thinking skills, fostering an open and respectful dialogue among scholars and seekers of truth.

The Rise and Fall of Logical Positivism: A Critical Examination of its Approach to Religious Language

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The paper is a critical examination of the approach to religious language that was developed by the leading representatives of logical empiricism in the first half of the 20th century. It mainly focuses on the members of the Vienna Circle but also considers their predecessors and continuators. I argue that the logical analysis of religious language worked out by 20th-century positivists constitutes a new and original achievement in the philosophical study of religion.

The main contribution of logical empiricists was to shift attention from the problem of therationality of religious statements to the problem of meaning. According to this approach, the rationality of religious beliefs can be studied only if religious statements have meaning. However, the logical analysis of religious language leads to the conclusion that key religious statements are meaningless. The meaninglessness of the religious language thesis proposed by logical positivistsis a consequence of a restrictive criterion of meaning known as the verification principle. According to this conception, the meaning of a proposition can be identified with a mode of its empirical verification. When applied to religious language, the principle was devastating in that it excluded most religious statements from the set of meaningful utterances. The criticism of logical positivism carried out by analytic and continental philosophers demonstrated that the empirical criterion of meaning was not only in adequate when applied to religion but also excluded a substantial part of scientific propositions.

The paper discusses the key tenets of logical positivism and their application to religious language. It focuses on religious words and sentences as primary objects of logical analysis aswell as on religious symbols and metaphors that are difficult to analyze logically. A substantial part of the paper is dedicated to the counter arguments and critiques of logical positivism's view of religious language. Despite the bankruptcy of the positivist program, the logical analysis of religious language had a considerable influence on subsequent philosophy of religion. Logical positivism was a driving force behind the linguistic turn that took place in the 20th century. Contemporary discussions on religious language are still under the influence of positivist conceptions.

God, Existence and Privation: Fārābīand the Logic of Theological Propositions

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In his discussion of God's mode of existence in the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas Aquinas states that when we assert that God exists, we use "exist" not to signify the act of existing (*actum essendi),* but rather we employ it in a second sense that signifies the truth of a proposition. Accordingly, he argues that such a statement is logically equivalent to statements like "blindness exists", since blindness is actually a lack of existence, but it is true to say that some men are blind (Sum. Theol., I, q.

48, a. 2, ob. 2 ad 2. See also Ventimiglia: 2020). This way of addressing the epistemic status of statements regarding God's existence is not unprecedented in Arabo-Islamic philosophy. Fārābī (d. 950 AD) has argued, well before Aquinas, that the statement regarding God's existence is logically equivalent to statements that signify deprivations such as blindness and voidness. The purpose of this presentation is to explore Fārābī's account of the logical structure of statements regarding God's existence as it occurs within his discussion of the syntactic/semantic constituents of bipartite and tripartite logical sentences, as developed in his *Book of Letters* (*kītāb al-ḥūrūf*). In the first part, I will contextualize Fārābī's discussion of the senses of being against its Aristotelian back ground. It is customary for the Aristotelian tradition, following Aristotle's discussion in *Metaphysics* Δ7, to identify four sense of being: 1) being *per accidens,* 2) being *per se,* 3) being as truth, 4)being as actuality and potentiality. However, Fārābī only recognizes two main senses of being: 1) being as true which is a second order property which designates that some concept is instantiated, b) beingas what is circumscribed by aquiddity outside the soul (*kītāb al-ḥūrūf,* §89-90).This account is entirely consistent with Fārābī's position in his *Risālahfījawābmasa'ilsu'ila 'anhā* in which he argues that existence is not a real predicate (Rescher: 1963). In the second section, I will delve into Fārābī's discussion regarding the logical structure of bipartite and tripartite sentences and the semantic differences they entail. Fārābī states that, from a syntactical perspective, bipartite and tripartite sentences can be reconstructed in two main interrogative forms: a) Does X exist? b) Does X exist as Y? Since being can be predicated in two ways, he concludes that there are, in general, four forms of propositions (Ibid, § 211-212). He then focuses his discussion on propositions regarding God's existence. He argues that since we have no knowledge of God's real essence as a positive and actual being in the world, we are only able to attribute the concept of being to God as a second-order property. When someone asks, "Does God exist?" they are inquiring whether the concept of God is instantiated or, in other words, whether it is the case that God exists. Therefore, he asserts that the proposition "God exists" is logically equivalent to propositions that indicate privations in the world, such as void and blindness. When someone asserts that the void exists, they do not imply the existence of a positive reality outside the world *possessing* the property of being void. Rather, they simply mean that the concept of void has been *instantiated*.

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Free Will, Determinism and God's Omniscience

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In the religious context, the concept of free will expresses the possibility of an unrestrained, affirmative or negative response to the call that God directs to us. Free will in this context involves personal responsibility to God – not only for our actions, but also for our decisions – even if some external circumstances prevented those decisions from being carried out. The possibility of free will understood in this way is closely related to the capacity for initiating causal chains, thus is incompatible with the so-called causal determinism – the thesis that every event is the result of previous events, occurring due to a causal mechanism established by the relevant laws of nature. Therefore, I take an incompatibilist position in relation to the concepts outlined in this way. At the same time, I argue that there is a good argument for accepting this concept of free will – and thus rejecting this form of determinism. This argument is based on the observation that free willis a better explanation of certain facts than determinism.

The basic fact for which free will is the best explanation is the fact that in many cases we are able to accurately predict our own long-term actions or the implementation of complex schedules – on the basis that we have decided to do these things. The competing hypothesis says that there is, after all, a causal determinant of these long-term effects, namely the neurophysiological correlate of making a resolution. I find this hypothesis implausible.It is bound to postulate some neurophysiological structure (state or process) with a specific causal power, capable of maintaining that power for years to eventually produce its effect at a specific moment. Furthermore, the existence of this particular causal determination would have to be conscious: the subject may not know the mechanisms of its operation, but she is aware that her future action has just been determined by her resolution.

The stipulation of such a causal connection being established many years before the occurrence of the effect – correlated, moreover, with the subject's knowledge that such determination has taken place – is hardly plausible, considering that such a stable structure would suddenly appear in an open system like the brain, constantly bombarded with external stimuli interfering with internal processes. From the perspective of scientific methodology, it looks like a classic hypothesis *ad hoc*, lacking any other explanatory purpose except to save determinism.

This incompatibilist conclusion counters the expectation that could arise in theology, in connection with attempts to reconcile human free will with the omniscience and omnipotence of God. Popular understandings of the omniscience

seem to suggest some form of external determination: God knows in advance what we will do later. However, this suggestion should be rejected. God is beyond time, and God's omniscience does not amount to any form of precognition. For God, every moment is "now" and directly accessible to Him. God sees what we do, watching us co-create the world with Him.

Antilogisms and Antinomies: Comparing the Role of Contradiction in Christine Ladd-Franklin's Theory of Deductive Reasoning and Semyon Frank's Theory of Mystical Discourse

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This paper brings together two thinkers who are not ordinarily juxtaposed: Christine Ladd-Franklin (1847-1930), an American logician, mathematician and psychologist, and Semyon Frank (1877-1950), a key figure in Russian religious philosophy. Ladd-Franklin introduced the idea of the antilogism to formal logic. Frank's philosophy, which he called antinomic panentheism, emphasizes the role of antinomy or paradox in mysticism and metaphysics. This paper argues that they made parallel claims, highlighting waysk in which syllogistic logic and mystical language are both akin to and distinct from each other.

Ladd-Franklin (1883, 1928) argued that all syllogistic figures can be reduced to a single parasyllogistic figure, the antilogism. It consists of two mutually consistent statements combined with a third that contradicts them. Reduction to the antilogism provides a single test of syllogistic validity. If a syllogism is valid, then it will produce a valid antilogism, in which "two universals must have their common term of unlike sign (once positive and once negative […]); but either universal with the particular must have their common term of like sign" (1928: 533). Ladd-Franklin's claim that every case of syllogisitic validity can be tested by reduction to the antilogism been validated, with some modifications to her argument (Russinoff 1999). In addition, Ladd-Franklin argued that the antilogism is superior to the syllogism not only on grounds of logical simplicity, but also because, in contrast to formal syllogisms, full antilogisms occur naturally in everyday speech.

Whereas Ladd-Franklin argued for the primacy of the antilogism in deductive logic, Frank (1965 [1956]} held that the fundamental form of mystical discourse is the antinomy. A classic example is that God is both transcendent and immanent. His inspiration was Nicholas of Cusa's (1401-1464) doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum, which he expanded to encompass not only language about God but also any metaphyical reality, including human nature.

Bringing together Ladd-Franklin's and Frank's positions enables us to treat deductive reasoning and mystical discourse as parallel processes, simultaneously made similar and distinct through the role of logical contradiction in each. On the one hand, contradiction assumes a positive role in both types of discourse as a unifying and grounding function. On the other, deductive logic and mysticism take contradiction in different directions. For the former, it leads to the decisive affirmation or negation of a comprehensible proposition. For the latter, contradiction leads to super-rational cognition/non-cognition of an incomprehensible reality. In essence, logic and mysticism become complementary ways of deplying contradiction.

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God's Omniscience, Newcomb's Paradox and Probability of Conditionals

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God's omniscience (which is typically taken to contribute to God's greatness) is one of classic problems of philosophical theology. The aim of the talk is to discuss its connection with a classic paradox in decision theory, i.e. Newcomb's problem. It has not been designed to discuss theological matters – but it inspires interesting discussion concerning God's foreknowledge.

In Newcomb's problem there is a agent who chooses between two boxes A and B. Box A is transparent and always contains $1,000 (the agent can see it). Box B contains $1,000,000 or nothing.

Apart from the agent there is also a omniscient predictor (naturally interpreted as God). If the predictor has predicted that the agent will take both boxes A and B, then box B contains nothing. But if the predictor has predicted that the agent will take only box B, then box B contains $1,000,000.

What should the agent do?

The problem has clear connections to conditionals, in a counterfactual mode. When trying to conceptualize the problem we encounter conditional sentences like:

> "If the agent were to take boxes A and B, then God would have believed that one would take A and B."

The status of such claims is a notorious philosophical problem, in particular if we conceptualize it in terms of probability. It is possible to propose two – seemingly equally rational – lines of argumentation, each of which gives a different recommendation for how the agent should act in Newcomb's situation. One is based on so-called evidential decision theory (EDT) and the other on causal decision theory (CDT). Not going into technical details (which will be kept to a minimum in the talk), the agent should try to maximize a particular value, depending on certain probabilities. These values they are defined in a different way in the cases of EDT and CDT.

In the talk we discuss how the assumptions concerning the evaluation of probability of conditionals might influence the analysis of Newcomb's paradox (in the context of God's omniscience).

Logical Concept or Religious Conversion: The Notion of Analysis in Pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena, and Hugh of Saint-Victor

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The concept of analysis is usually understood as a process of dividing and organizing a complex problem into smaller parts to achieve better comprehension. Such a general term is used both in sciences and humanities encompassing a variety of meanings, forms, and realizations in various disciplines.My presentation aims to reveal a thoroughly different meaning of analysis that one can find in the works of medieval Christian philosophers who developed their thoughts under the influence of Greek Neoplatonists.

Proclus interpreted analysis as a reverse of division (merismos). In the Neoplatonic thought, in which reality is understood dynamically as processing from the First Principle (the supersubstantial One/God) and returning to It, a crucial role is played by the notion of the return or conversion (epistrophē), the moment when what is ontically lower redirects towards the higher, as the object of desire, love, and the ultimate goal. The notion of analysis served as a synonym of epistrophē concerning the logical operation that allows to pass from the diversity of effects to the unity of their cause. Pseudo-Dionysius and his Christian followers not only adopted this understanding of analysisbut also applied it to the allegorical interpretation of the Bible. Dionysius, Eriugena, and Hugh of Saint Victor pointed out different meanings of analysis. Firstly, the concept of analysis as a return is linked with God's work of redemption and restoration. Secondly, the soul "analytically" approaches God by contemplating scriptural and sacramental symbols. Thirdly, only Eriugena spoke of analysis as an exegetical discipline consisting of unveiling the intellectual meaning of biblical motifs that seem mysterious and obscure.

The approaches of the three Christian thinkers show how a primarily logical concept gained a religious interpretation. Above all, they demonstrate that throughout the history of philosophy, the significance of a notion mighthange to such an extent that now it means almost the opposite of what it meant in the past.

5. Workshops

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM AND SYMBOLIC LOGIC

Organizers: **Jean-Yves Beziau and Caroline Pires Ting**, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Keynote Speaker: **Franziska Kohlt**, University of Leeds, UK and University of Southern California, USA, "Lewis Carroll's Logic and Religion"

On the one hand symbolism is important in most religions, on the other hand modern logic is often characterized as symbolic. This workshop, part of the 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion, explores the relation bewteen these two symbolic approaches. Suggested topics include – but are not limited to – the following:

- Boole's symbolic mathematical notation in logic and abstract religious notions,

- Zoroastrianism's dualism, Pythagoras's table of opposites, Trinity Christian triangle, Islamic geometrical objects and the theory of oppositions,
- Yin/Yang and the notion of complementary contradiction the symbolism of the cross, crucifixion, negation and abnegation,
- Venn symbolic logic, Venn diagrams and their application to understanding of religious phenomena,
- the universal quantifier and catholicism as a religion for all,
- is the existential quantifier really symbolizing existence?
- Cabala symbolism and logic in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland by Charles Dodgson, aka Lewis Carroll, deacon in the Church of England and symbolic logician,
- logical "interpretation" of Gödel's proof of the existence of God in symbolic logic.

The Universal Symbol of the Cross as the Sign of Balancing Opposites and Generating Order. A Comparative Study

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This comparative study is going to prove that a symbol of the cross is man's companion from the very twilight of the human civilisation, most probably form the very moment when a human being took on the journey as a bipedal individual. As a result it is bipedalism that determined our space orientation, backward, forward and to the sides; four directional movements that draw a shape of the cross. In the beginning I present and discuss the earliest expression the idea of the cross expressed as man's mental concept that were found in the world by cultural anthropologist. Then I focus my research on developmental symbolism of the Christian cross which initially did not bear a figure of the crucified God's Son, but manifested its direct origin form the Hebrew temple priest's Urim and Thummim, a device for obtaining oracles. As we observe to the high priest's ephod (an apron like garment) was attached a kind of a breastpiece or a pouch inlaid with 12 precious stones engraved with the names of the 12 tribes of Israel. Such seems to be the very prototype of the early Christian *crux gemmata,* which bore obviously different symbolism attributed to the precious stones used.

In addition I find it important to distinguish semantics and mental concepts of the Greek and the Roman crosses. The research is going to be concluded by a discussion of an instructive notions both of the majestic and noble humanity that were introduced in certain period of the Gothic art with the certain representation of the Christ body attached to the cross. It dealt with the divine humanity of Christ and served as a model of victorious attitude of the Man of Sorrow. This will be exemplified with two pieces of art, the one is the 13th century *Rood from Kamień Pomorski,* Poland, the other, the 12th century Catalonian rood called *Majestat Batilo*, Spain.

The Buddhist Seng Zhao's Roots in Neo-Daoism:
Ex Contradictione Nihil

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Seng Zhao (c.374-414) is a Chinese Neo-Daoist who converted himself to Mahřayřana Buddhism. Few people doubt his infuence on Chinese Buddhist philosophy. In this article, provided his Neo-Daoism (*xuanxue*) and Buddhism, we will interpret how Seng Zhao featured a symbolic meaning of the void (*śřunya*) as rooted originally in Daoism.

To the end of 'void' in the name of 'nothing' (*nihil*), we will further elaborate on his defence of ECN (*ex contradictione nihil* – nothing follows from contradictions) by way of dialectics and epistemological accounts. Finally, by reconstructing his Neo-Daoist approach to contradictions, we conclude the Mahřayřanic significance of the void.

Throughout the article, as applied to Seng Zhao's approach, we will demonstrate the following Daoist argument for contradictions from the *Daodejing* of Laozi:

1. $\forall x(\varphi(\Psi x \wedge \neg \Psi x))$
2. $\forall x(\Box(\Omega x \wedge \Omega x) \supset \Omega x \wedge \Omega x)$
3. $\varphi(\varsigma) \supset \Box(\varsigma)$
C. $\forall x(\Psi x \wedge \neg \Psi x)$

Any contradiction ($\Psi x \wedge \neg \Psi x$) within an ultimate and universal set of Dao (x) is concluded by the inference of conceivability (operator φ) and necessity (operator $\Box$). To this end, the contradiction (i.e. confirming the oppositions, such as beautiful/ugly and good/bad) invalidates the principle of non-contradiction. On our view, if a contradiction is inferred in the argument above, then ECN. When nothing (no proposition) is further deduced (ECN), everything is assumed to be limitlessly (or trivially) realised as a predicate of the *Dao* in the name of 'nothing', the ultimate void. That is, if the contradiction is conceived (P1) and necessitated (P2) and there is also pre-theoretic implication ($\Psi^\varphi \Vdash \Psi^\Box$) for P3, then from this consequence nothing does follow. We will defend this ECN in the Chinese Neo-Daoist and Buddhist context, especially in the *Buzhenkonglun* of Seng Zhao.

A Many-valued Logic Intended to Model Silence

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Silence is a diverse and intangible concept that we learn to interpret within the context where it appears. Here we show that there are various knowledge areas that have studied such phenomenon. We argue that "silence" is a manifestation of intentional communication. The seventh thesis of the Tractatus of Wittgenstein focuses on linguistic silence: "Where of one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent".

We claim that some well known many-valued logics can be used to interpret the notion of "silence". So, we introduce a new 5-valued paraconsistent logic that we name MS. This logic is genuine and paracomplete, and has the new value that is called s attempting to model the notion of "silence".

MS is a conservative extension of FDEe, a logic proposed by Priest. If one drops the "implication" connective from MS, one obtains FDEe. If, on the other hand, one drops the ineffability value from MS one obtains a well known 4-valued logic introduced by Avron. We present some properties of this new logic.

The Symbolism of Complementary and Contradictory Opposition: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and Western Ontological Constructs

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This proposed investigation analyses the concepts of complementary (Yin/Yang duality) and antithetical opposition within Chinese philosophy. A critical component of this inquiry involves comparing how Chinese and Western ontologies diverge. Contrary to Platonic or Kantian interpretations of 'essence' (ousia), the equivalent term in Chinese language does not reflect a notion of an immutable substance. Chinese ontology, instead, emphasizes a binary concept incorporating both complementarity and contradiction, encompassed within the 'yin-yang' framework and the principle of 'li-qi' 理氣 (interpreted as principle and vital force). This distinctive philosophical methodology has significantly exerted influence upon eastern schools of thought.

The Chinese characters for 'Contradiction', 矛盾 (Máodùn), individually mean a spear矛 (máo) and a shield盾 (dùn), thereby suggesting intrinsic opposition comparable to Aristotle's Law of Non-Contradiction. The term's etymology is derived from a morality story found in the Legalist text written by Han Feizi (韩非子) from the Warring States period (475-221 BCE).This narrative tells the story of a Chu state merchant boasting about his impenetrable shields and infallible lances, only to be left speechless when asked what would happen if his lance was used against his shield. The tale ends by noting the impossibility of both the "impervious shields" and "the penetrative lances" existing concurrently. This parable exemplifies the inherent contradiction of two propositions that cannot be simultaneously true, but could both potentially be false.

Unraveling the logic inherent in Chinese thought, especially the paradox of consistent similarity amidst constant change, presents a complex challenge. This exploration will track the progression of the "opposition" symbols within Chinese philosophy, from the pre-imperial period in the fifth century B.C. to its modern manifestations in the sociopolitical landscape of twentieth-century People's Republic of China.

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[1] Postdoctoral research fellow – FAPERJ PDR10.

LOGIC OF RECONCILIATION

LOGIC OF RECONCILIATION
Sinaia 3-8 September 2023

"Un minuto de reconciliación tiene más mérito que toda una vida de amistad."
"One minute of reconciliation is worth more than a whole life of friendship."

Gabriel García Márquez, *Cien años de soledad*

Organizers: **Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska**, **Piotr Leśniewski**, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland/Logica Universalis Association

Keynote Speaker: **Antonios Kalogerakis**, Orthodox Academy of Crete

Title of Keynote Talk: *Face-to-Face: Exploring a Path of Reconciliation Inside the Nature*

WORKSHOP DESCRIPTION:

We invite you to submit abstracts to the workshop "Logic of Reconciliation", where we want to reflect together on the meaning and look for processes and adequate procedures of reconciliation.

We follow this Spanish expression: "God always forgives, we forgive sometimes, but nature never forgives." ("Dios perdona siempre, los hombres a veces y la naturaleza nunca") and therefore we believe that dialogical approach provides original, relevant and profound input towards complex and difficult processes of reconciliation.

According to Martin Buber, relationships are created in three spheres: in our life with nature, with people, and with intelligible forms. The misery of people is related with broken relations with all these three spheres, therefore we propose to reflect on reconciliation with nature, with other human beings (but also with oneself) and with God.

During the workshop we want to focus precisely on dialogical reconciliation because that kind of reconciliation does not require unification.

Topics include, but are not restricted to:

- concepts of reconciliation,
- models of reconciliation,
- dynamics of reconciliation,
- examples of reconciliation,
- reconciliation and religions,
- religious experiences of reconciliation,
- dialogical reconciliation vs. uniformity and unification,
- reconciliation with the other,
- reconciliation with oneself,
- reconciliation with nature,
- styles of reconciliation,
- reconciliation through art,
- reconciliation through dialogue,
- is there an alternative to reconciliation?

A Dialogue between a Theist and an Atheist.
Is there a Possible Reconciliation?

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In the thirteenth century there was an expansion of the square when William of Sherwood proposed an intermediate corner between the A corner and the I corner, and its corresponding negative side between the E corner and the O corner. In our days it has been proposed (by Blanché and others) a hexagon outside the square, between the lower corners I and O, and the upper corners A and E. Thus, it has been proposed to add new corners vertically and horizontally. Thus we have two different hexagons which may be combined in an octagon that integrates the new members. The hexagon of opposition has had various applications in various fields of knowledge where we can find modal hexagons, epistemic hexagons and even analogical hexagons. We should notice that there are squares such as the Deontic and Doxastic squares which admit no Sherwood-type hexagons. Starting from a Modal Square, we can expand it to get a modal octagon which could be useful to show agreements and disagreements in a dialogue between the theist and the atheist. In this talk I try to set a dialogue where the two participants show where they can agree and where a consensus is impossible. Is there no way of reconciliation among them? Perhaps we could and we will explore different hexagons to answer this question. In this figure D: God does exist. Nec D v Impos D Nec D Nec -D D D Pos D Pos -D Pos D ∧ Pos-D ~

Reconciliation in Sport: Dialogical Physical Culture

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Jan Łukasiewicz said – logic is the ethic of thinking. Logical culture, proposed by Ajdukiewicz implies clarity in thinking and the consequence of acting and thinking. Logic is an ability that should pierce all aspects of life. It's constant caring for the quality of thinking. Inspired by the logical culture of Ajdukiewicz and the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber and Paulo Freire I propose dialogical physical culture: the possibility of reconciliation with the body, self and others. I focus on Rosenzweig's concept of philosophy of relations; Buber's basic pair of words: I-Thou and I-It; Freire's relations of Oppressor and the Oppressed, banking education and possibilities of liberation. Alfred White head in *Religion in The Making* wrote: religion is what an individual does with his own solitarness.

I analyze David Foster Wallace's essay *Tennis Player Michael Joyce's Professional Artistry as a Paradigm of Certain Stuff about Choice, Freedom, Discipline, Joy, Grotesquerie, and Human Completeness* as an example of modern physical culture and analogy of sports and religion. Then I discuss two stories: of Mary Cain, a runner, and Lidia Yuknavitch, a swimmer and author of *The Chronology of Water*. Their examples testify to the possibility of reconciliation with the body, Nature and self. They are also prospects of how to build dialogical physical culture.

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Reconciliation in History Contingency and Necessity in Later Merleau-Ponty and Hannah Arendt

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In this paper I present a comparative analysis of later Merleau-Ponty's conception of history as "logic within contingence" and Hannah Arendt's unexplored thesis that historical reality is "caused contingently". My aim is, mainly, to show that there is in both thinkers a common attempt to reconcile contingency and necessity in history and, secondly, to bring to light disparities which point to a different interpretation of the nature of Being.

Merleau-Ponty's abandonment of reductionist Marxism leads him to develop an approach which interweaves historical tendencies with the appearance of the fortuitous. In the Lectures at the Collège de France, he introduces the concept of institution. Now history is conceived as a milieu of life, an interrelation between underlying causality and human freedom. I show how the interdependence of instituting activity and instituted state allows for a certain amount of free play within the vectors of history, leading him to define historical novelty as "a transformation that preserves [but also] surpasses".

Concerning Arendt, I focus on her examination in *The Life of the Mind* of Duns Scotus' devotion to "save freedom" by paying "the price of contingency". My intention is to demonstrate the importance of this discussion in terms of Arendt's understanding of history. I suggest an interpretation that allows for the detection of a theory of contingent causation, although she is not entirely explicit about it. According to Arendt's main assumptions (formulated in *The Human Condition*), human freedom as pure inauguration appears through action and "history is… the outcome of action". By realizing how Arendt conceives human action as the causative element in human affairs, which condemns them to contingency, I argue for an approach which strikes a balance between contingency and necessity in history.

Despite their common intentions, there remains some important discrepancies. The fact that Merleau-Ponty's perspective does not allow for the emergence of the radically new, reveals a divergence in the way they both reconcile contingency and necessity. I argue that this divergence points to a deeper ontological level. By looking into their respective conception of Being, I spot the subtle differences between the Merleaupontyan "flesh" and the Arendtian "in-between", which justify their conflicting views on historical novelty.

Styles of Reconciliation

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Our talk presents two general styles of reconciliation based on Eugenio D'Ors distinction between classic and baroque *eons* (analogical constants) that correspond to the opposition between peace and reconciliation, following Reyes Mate. Baroque is understood not as a historic style, but as a supratemporal analogical system. We develop our proposition also on the basis of Alejo Carpentier's description of baroque as a constant of human spirit.

Also we will briefly present historical and cultural style, with baroque as cultural and dialogical style.

After Valéry and Trafford logic is essential part of dialogue and there is no reconciliation without dialogical relations. Therefore, we will briefly reflect on the role of logic in a process of reconciliation.

At the end we consider the issue, how the baroque model of reconciliation constitutes a radical alternative to conflict and vengeance, and also enables peace and progressive improving of the relation between two former opponents.

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Reconciliation in Haiti: A Vodou Perspective

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Haiti's religious composition is often described as 90% Catholic (a vestige of colonial France), 10% Protestant, and 100% Vodou. However, besides being labelled as an evil practice marked in blood and angry spirits, Vodou has been banned for most of Haiti's history being Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Salesian priest who transitioned into politics and became the country's first democratically elected president, who finally granted the decentralized, non-scripture-based Vodou faith official recognition in 2004.

As a nation, Haiti's traumatic history can be traced back to its violent colonization and the brutal treatment of enslaved Africans on its soil, arguably the Americas' most infamously cruel slavery regime. Following a tumultuous struggle for freedom from France – set in motion during a Vodou ceremony – Haiti emerged as a sovereign state and the first ever black republic being born out of slavery in 1804.

Yet, ever since and up to this day, its path has been marred by extreme poverty, political instability, episodes of violent mass unrest or *dechoukaj*s (or *uprisings* in Haitian Kreyòl), dictatorships, foreign interventions, and a relentless onslaught of natural disasters, health crises and severe environmental degradation.

At the surface, Haiti's underdevelopment is evident. Deeper still, lies a much more profound and shared psychological scarring, with long-lasting consequences, perpetuating a relentless cycle of repetition, seemingly turning trauma into an eternal reenactment of horrific past events.

Within Vodou, misery and injustice is seeing not as not punishment from a vengeful god (deism best explains Vodou's supreme god *Bondye*, creator of all yet unconcerned with human matters) but is rather a sign of broken relationships and an unbalance in the spiritual world in need of correction via *serving* (and not *praying* or *worshipping*) the spirits (*Lwa*) and the ancestral dead (*Mo*) who exist below *Bondye*.

Considering that in this belief system, among other important premises, a person is free to do as wish – yet also responsible for all the consequences – my objective is to explore what does bondage, retaliation, justice, solidarity and forgiveness mean according to the Vodou morality or ethical framework? What are the Christian and African influences in Vodou's understanding of such concepts? And, ultimately, to examine reconciliation in Haiti through the lens of Vodou (as a spiritual practice) and its history as a nation.

Overcoming Tyranny: Models of Reconciliation from Political Doctrines of 16th Century Poland

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In my presentation I will talk about Polish religious freedom and its political foundations, especially about The Warsaw Confederation and Henrician Articles. I would like to focus on legal ways of preventing tyranny and the logic and mechanism behind it. In my talk I will analyze originality of Polish 16th century Political Doctrines promoting tolerance and dialogue in contrast with brutal religious conflicts, especially in France in the era of Reformation. Moreover, I will emphasize some models of reconciliation that, in my opinion, are not only of historical importance, but can help us in rethinking religious tolerance of 21st century Europe.

The originality of Polish political thought of consisted in the strong belief that universal tendencies towards abuse of power and tyranny should lead us not towards desperation and violent conflicts, but to preparing in advance procedures of reconciliation as well as mechanism that prevent and limit corruption and monopoly of power.

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Inter-Religious Common Values Semantic Web Ontology Logics

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Apart from their theologies and theopoetics logical differences, religions present singular logics systems concerning their social practices and services. The inter-religious movement, since its institutional birth in the 1893 Parliament of World's Religions, has been co-developing a continued iteration of experimental dialogues between different religious traditions representatives audited by civil society leaders and scholars in order to diplomatically establish international rule-of-law common values compliance standards to facilitate world improvements, urgently needed, such as: humanitarian services, solidarity economies, peacebuilding initiatives, harm-reduction programs, academic research, faith-based organizations sustainable development logistics, science promotion, multi-religious literacy courses, and faith-inspired cultural and sacred-natural heritage safeguard. This challenging process gifted us a well-documented, but still unkown of the general public, legacy of principle charters and guidelines, from an ever-expanding ecosystem of inter-religious institutions, with vocabularies that includes concepts, such as: nonviolence, golden rule, compassion, respect, social economic justice, consensus, values, fundamental moral attitutes, trust, consciousness, responsibility, duty, global ethics, interdependence, peace culture, joy, and reconciliation. I would like to analyze with you the different social service logics implemented in these different charters and what could be their logic open science collaborative implementation as a top-level semantic web domain-specific ontology, for ontological alignment of other domains ontologies, to inquiry the compliances that it would create for concerning religious related subjects, such as: UNESCO Theasaurus, Wikidata, Iconclass and Getty vocabularies on religious arts, the Semantic Interoperability To access Cultural Heritage (STITCH) interontology, the Humanitarian Aid for Refugee in Emergencies (HARE), LexData, among others. With this proposal I aim to understand, in compliance with international rule-of-law inter-religious-based common values logics how open science labor ethics sustainable development using open source consensus technologies may supply the open access ontological repositories, such as the OntoCommons, with an inter-religious standard for faith-based workers heuristic analysis and for technologies, such as algorithmic artificial intelligence (AI), meanwhile promoting semantic web literacy for the general public with the support of religious studies, peace studies, cultural diplomacy studies, and interfaith studies scholars for the common good.

Inner Conflict and Reconciliation with Oneself

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According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term "reconciliation" has two main meanings. The first one: *an end to a disagreement or conflict with somebody and the start of a good relationship again* and the second one: *the process of making it possible for two different ideas, facts etc. to exist together without being opposed to each other*.

In my presentation, I would like to underline a human conflict with oneself and a process of reconciliation with oneself as an essential activity of regaining trust and faith 'in' and 'for' human existence. Following Martin Buber, the author of *I and Thou*, I reduce Buberian relation's perspective of two subjects to one person, where both *I* and *Thou* apply to the same person.

To specify this peculiar human condition, I refer to prison literature and authors such as Józef Maria Czapski, Martin Luther King and Rosa Luxemburg. The main figures of political and artistic life were pushed to their limits in prisons, concentration camps and gulags. But the crucial example here is Oscar Wilde and his text *De Profundis*. As he stated: *The two great turning-points of my life were when my father sent me to Oxford and when society sent me to prison*. In a form of a letter, the Irish poet explained step by step the logical process of reconciliation with the figure of Jesus Christ as the romantic-individualistic role model. All this happened at the breaking point of his life, when his whole career and personal life were ruined, and Wilde himself created the masterpiece in a penitentiary in Reading. That was the time when the most genuine and sincere literature was born.

APPLYING MATHEMATICS TO THEOLOGY

Keynote Speaker: **Mircea Dumitru**, University of Bucharest
Organiser: **Stanisław Krajewski**, University of Warsaw

The workshop "Applying Mathematics to Theology" will be devoted to the problem of mathematical models, concepts and inspirations that have influenced or can influence theology and religious studies. Also papers arguing for the impossibility of such applications or the misleading character of attempts to apply mathematics to theology are welcome.

Here are the papers by the undersigned that can introduce some of the relevant topics:
Stanisław Krajewski, Mathematical Models in Theology. A Buber-inspired Model of God and its Application to Shema Israel, Journal of Applied Logics 6(6), 2019, 1007-1020.
Stanisław Krajewski, Is Mathematics Connected to Religion? In: Sriraman B. (eds) Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19071-2_77-2 - to appear.

Three Views on Number (Cantor, Cohen, Husserl). Theological and Philosophical Aspects

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The philosophical and theological dimension has always been inherent in mathematics. If for the Pythagoreans and Neoplatonists the number itself had a divine status, then in monotheistic religions God is identified with actual infinity. So in Judaism, one of the common names for God is Ein-Sof (Infinity). One of the adherents of the mathematical comprehension of God as Infinite was Nicholas of Cusa. The fundamental changes in mathematics brought about by the scientific revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries led to the need to reassess the theological dimension of finite and infinite numbers. In this report, we will consider three concepts of number, formulated at the end of the 19th century by Georg Cantor, Hermann Cohen and Edmund Husserl. All of them were made at the same time in two German universities - Halle and Marburg. Despite the similarity of topics, the religious and philosophical aspects of the teachings of these authors are strikingly different. For Cantor, the discovery of transfinite numbers had a clear theological meaning, containing many distinct infinities in Divine realities. This demonstrated diversity of spiritual reality. Cantor discussed in detail the religious aspects of his set theory in correspondence with mathematicians and theologians. Husserl considered the problem of number in the realm of subjectivity. In his first works "On the Concept of Number" (Über den Begriff der Zahl, 1887) and "Philosophy of Arithmetic" (Philosophie der Arithmetik, 1891), he considers number as a structure of subjectivity. Mathematical problems permeate Cohen's work from the very beginning of his philosophical activity, when he wrote "Plato's Doctrine of Ideas and Mathematics" (1878) to his last work, "The Religion of Reason" from the Sources of Judaism (1919). If in the book The "Principle of the Method of Infintesmals and its History" (1883) Cohen explores the difference between the concepts of Newton and Leibniz regarding infinitesimals, then in "The Religion of Reason" he gives his mathematical ideas a theological interpretation. The main difference between Cohen and the two named authors is that he is not interested in the mathematical structure of the spiritual world, but in the mathematical interpretation of the process of approaching God. The philosophy and theology of Cohen is dynamic. It is interesting that these three mathematical-philosophical doctrines became the basis of three important trends in the philosophy of the 20th century.

Is Mathematics Essential in *The Star of Redemption?*

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We reconsider the issue of the role of mathematics in Franz Rosenzweig's famous theological-philosophical treatise *The Star of Redemption*, taking into account Matthew Handelman's recent contributions, in which he is arguing that the use of mathematics by Rosenzweig was essentially more than a 'metaphor,' or an 'analogy.' In addition, the insights of Norbert Samuelson are used as well as other scholarship devoted to Hermann Cohen and his student Rosenzweig, without disregarding critical attitudes of mathematicians to both Cohen and Rosenzweig.

How is it possible to resolve the problem arising from contradictory opinions regarding Rosenzweig's and Cohen's use of mathematics? A natural way out is proposed: while mathematics is essential for *The Star* in the context of discovery, it is not essential in the context of justification.

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On Borrowing

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"I bleed, for my knee bleeds": According to some *parts* of Eleonore Stump's recorded lecture at the *Logic & Religion Webinar* in December 2022 with its discussion, I "borrows" the property of bleeding from its knee then. More generally, somebody bleeds if some of its constituents bleeds: bleeding is "borrowing".

We could formalise the topos generally, based on first-order logic with descriptive predicate symbols $C^{(2)}$, $P^{(1)}$. We first define *P-constituents:*

$x \, C_p \, y :\leftrightarrow x \, C \, y \land Px$. Next is *having P-constituents:* $P_C x :\leftrightarrow \exists y \, y \, C_p \, x$. Now we can determine "borrows" and "borrowing":

DEFINITION.   (i) $x \, Bor'_C \, P :\leftrightarrow (P_C x \rightarrow Px)$;

(ii) $Bor'_C P :\leftrightarrow \forall x \, x \, Bor'_C \, P$.

We are ready to treat the initial example. Let $Bor'_C P$ ("bleeding is 'borrowing' "), $d \, C \, c$ ("my knee is part of me"). Now suppose Pd ("my knee bleeds"). Thence $d \, C_p \, c$, whence $P_C c$. Since, particularly, $c \, Bor'_C \, P$, viz.

$P_C c \rightarrow Pc$, by modus ponens, Pc ("I bleed"). If, conversely, Pc , then, since bleeding is "*lending*" too, $P_C c$. Properties need not be "borrowing":

Integers >1 have prime factors, but may not be prime.

We found that something having positive and negative constituents cannot "borrow" a property and its negative at the same time:

THEOREM. $\pm P_C x \rightarrow \neg \, x \, Bor'_C P, -P$.

The proof/derivation proceeds by contradiction.

COROLLARY. $\pm P_C \rightarrow \neg \, Bor'_C P, -P$.

Basically, borrowing is transferring. If the "loan" is some property,

$(Px \leftarrow Py) \leftrightarrow x \supseteq_p y$ accords.

Therefore simultaneous lending & borrowing corresponds to $\equiv_p$ surprisingly, which we introduced to specify *equality* (see e. g. "The Inhomogeneity of Concepts", *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* **28** (2022), pp. 602-3).

In our case, *x borrows P from some part of itself:*

$x \, Bor_C \, P :\leftrightarrow \exists y \, (x \supseteq_p y \land y \, C \, x)$.

How are $x \, Bor'_C \, P$ and $x \, Bor_C \, P$ related whatsoever?

Short Circuits or Fruitful Mutual Irritations? – Encounters of Mathematics and Theology in Nicholas of Cusa and Georg Cantor

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Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) and Georg Cantor (1845-1918) are presented as two thinkers who productively combined mathematics and theology. In the talk I am only marginally interested in discussing a possible influence of the older on the younger, but rather in comparing and distinguishing the intentions and argumentation structures. Indeed, at first glance, there are striking parallels between Cusanus, theologian, philosopher, and church reformer on the cusp of modernity, and Cantor, one of the central figures of mathematics on the cusp of mathematical modernity – despite the great temporal distance. In particular, the concept of *infinity* is in the center of interest for both thinkers. For Cusanus, 'infinity' is central to articulate his concept of God, at least in his early writings – later it loses its centrality a little bit. Moreover, his mathematical interest focuses on the problem of squaring the circle (and on that of incommensurability in the context of astronomy), so it is also strongly related to (mathematical) infinity. And Cantor, on the other side, is famous for his transfinite set theory which opens the door to a new field of mathematics and a conceptual frame for mathematics as a whole. But also Cantor tried to reflect his revolutionary concepts from a philosophical, i.e., metaphysical perspective. Furthermore, reflexions on (the appearance) of *contradictions* play an essential role for both thinkers as the transition point between mathematical and theological discourse. For Cusanus, with the figure of a '*coincidentia oppositorum,*' transcending the Aristotelian principle of excluded contradiction is one of the basic premises of his theology. Cantor, on the other hand, sees in the antinomies of set theory a sign of the limit of human cognition and a possibility of transition into a religious discourse. Here he confesses an "absolutely infinite" beyond any recognizability. Despite these important similarities, however, on closer examination also essential differences concerning the structure and quality of argumentation become apparent. On the basis of a structural comparison of these two authors we try to develop some criteria for a fruitful interrelation of theology and mathematics.

Angelic Worlds and Mathematical Objects

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Vladimir Lossky, one of the most influential Orthodox theologians of the first half of the 20th century, once mentioned in passing: "The unity of the angelic world is [...] completely different from ours [i.e. human—*V.S.*]. One may speak of the 'human species,' that is to say of countless persons possessing the same nature. But the angels, who are also persons, have no unity of nature. Each is a nature, an intelligible universe. Their unity is thus inorganic and, one may say by analogy, abstract: that of the city, the choir, the army, unity of service, of function, of praise, in sum, unity of harmony. In this way *one may establish remarkable similarities between music and mathematics on one side, and angelic worlds on the other*" [1, p.81, italics is mine]. It was said in one of his lecture courses published only posthumously, so we have no references or other comments to this passage.

Is it possible to unpack this alleged similarity and trace its roots in the theological tradition? This way of connecting mathematics with Christian theology was discussed and elaborated by Alexei Parshin, a Russian mathematician and well-known specialist in arithmetic geometry [2]. Parshin's interpretation is based on Alexei Losev's and Pavel Florensky's ideas. If we suppose that the number of angels is actually infinite, as Florensky did [3, p. 353], and the number of levels in the angelic hierarchy is also actually infinite, as Parshin did, it may make the whole story a non-trivial one from a mathematical point of view [2, pp. 145-146]. Can it be also made theologically non-trivial and help in the development of angelology?

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God and the Numbers

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According to Augustine, abstract objects are ideas in the Mind of God. Because numbers are a type of abstract object, it would follow that numbers are ideas in the Mind of God. Let us call such a view the Augustinian View of Numbers (AVN). In this paper, I present a 1st order, extensional, formal theory for AVN within non-well-founded set theory. The theory stems from the symmetry conception of God as it appears in Studtmann's *Divine Fractal* (Philosophia, 2021). I show that Robinson's Arithmetic, Q, can be interpreted by the theory in Studtmann's paper. The interpretation is made possible by identifying the set of natural numbers with God, 0 with Being, and the successor function with the essence function. The resulting theory can then be augmented to include Peano Arithmetic by adding a set-theoretic version of induction and a comprehension schema. In addition to these formal matters, the paper provides a characterization of the mind of God. According to the characterization, the Being essences that constitute God's mind act as both numbers and representations – each has all the properties of some number and encodes all the properties of that number's predecessor. The conception of God that emerges by the end of the discussion is a conception of an infinite, ineffable, axiologically and metaphysically ultimate entity that contains objects that not only serve as numbers but also encode information about each other. As an axiomatic mathematical approach to God, the theory presented in this paper provides a counterpoint to Gödel's axiomatic treatment of God. Whereas Gödel axiomatized the Leibnizian God, which is part of the Anselmian maximalist tradition, the theory in this paper stems from the neo-Platonic divine Mind, a conception of God that has beauty as its conceptual foundation and that shows up in many later thinkers including Augustine, Luria, Hegel, and Royce. Moreover, whereas Gödel's axiomatization is second order and intensional, the axiomatization in this paper is 1st order and extensional.

Using Category Theory to Model Methods of Biblical Reading

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Category theory, originally created to model mathematical systems, has found increasing applications to modeling systems outside of pure mathematics (Fong and Spivak 2019). This paper proposes some starting points for modeling how readers interpret biblical texts in terms of category theory. The motivation for our study is the current semiotic turn in religious studies (Boom and Põder 2021) and the application of mathematics to the semiotic analysis of devotional texts (Galofaro 2023). Our point of departure is the analysis of linguistic objects into expression and content (Hjelmslev 1969 [1943]), which was developed into Meaning-Text Theory (MTT) (Bolshakov and Gelbukh 2004). However, to the dyad of expression and content we add a third element: effect. When a reader engages with a text (i.e., as expression-content system), the text yields an effect, whether cognitive, affective or behavioral. Hence, "the life of a text" is a triad of expression-content-effect, which is easily treated as a category.

We apply this category theoretic interpretation of content-expression-effect (i.e., textual pragmatics) to the patristic tradition of "senses of Scripture" and contemplative reading. Hence, this study contributes to interdisciplinary approaches combining mathematics, semiotics and theology.

Category theory facilitates modeling complex interpretative processes. For example, in patristic and medieval exegesis, a biblical passage can have diverse senses (levels of meaning), such as literal and anagogical senses. We treat any given passage as an expression set (i.e., a set whose members are words, sentences, etc.) which can map onto a content set (i.e., a set consisting of units of information or meaning). The reader can map an expression set onto any content set, with each exegetical method represented as a morphism. Any mapping of expression onto content leads to a pragmatic effect, which is itslef a composition or complex morphism. We can then represent complex intertextual connections and chains of associations as categories. Autocommunication, a type of contemplative reading in which the reader recodes a textual code, is represented as a dual (or even higher degree) composite morphism.

On the Relevance of the Neo-Platonic Theology to Pythagorean Arithmetic Practice

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The Pythagorean arithmetic tradition represents a significant intellectual current, characterised by a specific approach to the construction of arithmetic, which originates in the early Pythagorean practice of *pebble arithmetic* and is an alternative to that of the Euclidean *Elements*. In contrast to the Euclidean style of arithmetic reasoning, the Pythagorean style is proofless visual reasoning over concrete objects of combinatorial character based on finitary recursive definitions [Vandoulakis 2009].

However, in the Neo-Pythagorean works, where this style is practised, arithmetic reasoning is blended with metaphysical ideas of various origins (Platonic, Aristotelian, and others), which are further advanced in other works called "theology of arithmetic."' For instance, Nicomachusof Gerasa, the author of the famous *Introduction to Arithmetic*, also wrote another lost work,*The Theology of Arithmetic*, presumably devoted to the metaphysics of arithmetic. A similar work is ascribed to Iamblichus, known as the *Theologoumena Arithmeticae*. Iamblichus also wrote an *Introduction to Arithmetic*, presumably similar to Nicomachus's corresponding treatise. Thus, arithmetic and metaphysics of arithmetic are combined in the Neo-Pythagorean tradition. Furthermore, "theology" itself is systematically advanced by Proclus in his work *The Elements of Theology*, which includes topics relevant to Pythagorean mathematics.

The question arises as to which extent the eclectic Neo-Pythagorean 'metaphysics of arithmetic' is related to the 'empirical' logic underlying the Pythagorean arithmetical practice. We will show that some of these metaphysical views tally with the Pythagorean arithmetical reasoning and could be interpreted as a "Pythagorean philosophy of arithmetic." In contrast, other views are speculative Neo-Platonic advances incompatible with the Neo-Pythagorean style of arithmetic reasoning. Theyare not derivable by philosophical reflexion upon the Pythagorean arithmetical practice but represent a biased Platonised interpretation of the Pythagorean arithmetic.

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CONCEPTS OF GOD:
CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY, AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES

Keynote Speaker:	**Richard Swinburne** (University of Oxford, UK)
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	Abbas Ahsan, University of Birmingham, UK;
	Daniel Molto, University of Sussex, UK;
	Alan Herbert, Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, UK.

Topics include, but are not restricted to:
- Is the concept of Godconsistent?
- Individual and joint (in)consistency of divine properties
- The role of consistency in the debate on the rationality of theistic belief
- Paraconsistent approaches to the concept of God
- Paradoxical accounts of God (and their solutions) in world religious traditions (e.g. the doctrine of Trinity in Cristianity, bhedabheda accounts in Indian religious traditions and God's essence and attributes in Islam)

The Damnation of the Innocent Interpretation Revisited: A Leibniz's Boethian and Molinistic Response

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Leibniz's unpublished text, Reflection of Bellarmine's tract on free will and Grace states, "The damnation of the innocent is indeed possible in itself, or something that does not imply a contradiction; but it is not possible for God… For we do not need to examine the whole harmony of things in order to know whether God is going to damn someone innocent eternally." Leibnizian scholars such as Robert Merrihew Adams and Michael V Griffin attempt to decipher what exactly this text means. For the former, he argues that if the damnation of the innocent is possible then there is a possible world in which the innocent are damned. For the latter, he argues that the damnation is possible intrinsically but it is impossible extrinsically since it is inconsistent with God who is necessary. Although both Adams and Griffin attempt to make sense of this text they both do not correctly interpret what Leibniz is saying here. In particular, the two are not including some important theological background and logical components that Leibniz uses and adheres to that would assist in deciphering what this text is trying to say. For this reason, my attempt in this paper is to pinpoint the missing theological background that Adams and Griffin seems to be missing and argue that such missing background is the theological influence that the works of Boethius and Molina had on Leibniz. From here I would give the logical component of Leibniz's thought and show that

a) by having Leibniz's Boethian background, we see that the damnation is possible since individuals for Leibniz have the freedom to do the contrary however because of God's foreknowledge God has the certainty of what we would do with our free will; and

b) by Leibniz having a Molinistic background, we see the damnation of the innocent is impossible for God since, through God's understanding – middle knowledge, simple intelligence or knowledge of vision, God knows what the individual has in its concept and cannot change that which he knows is in their concept.

Negative theology as a logical possibility

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Negative theology is an important feature of theological and philosophical thought across various traditions. By manipulating language and its rules in ways that are often on the edge – adopting paradoxes, meta-language, and possibly paraconsistency – negative theologies manage to disclose different levels of understanding and experience of their contextual worldviews. In all these cases, the subject and the object, or the grounding (e.g. God, the Buddha, the Doctrine) are reimagined and presented in ambiguous ways. In particular, this seems to be true of soteriology and the way it is structured through the various levels of negation and subtraction, which lead to the *via negativa*. Authors from the Christian tradition (such as Pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, and John of the Cross) as well as from the Buddhist one (Nagarjuna and some late Madhyamaka-influenced schools) will be discussed in order to show different forms of negation and of logical operations. What will be proposed is that these negative theologies are logical possibilities that emerge from the dialectical process of theologico-philosophical elaboration, as well as strategic techniques that often lead to a deeper perceived experience of the path.

Goodness and a Mormon God

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The longstanding Mormon conception of God includes four theses: (i) the Mormon God is a corporeal, finite being to whom maximal perfections are ascribed; (ii) the Mormon God was once human, having undergone a deification process under the direction of another deity; (iii) the Mormon God belongs to an infinite regress of deities, each having undergone a prior deification process; (iv) every human being belonging to this earth is undergoing a similar deification process under the direction

of the Mormon God. And yet, in spite of the finite period in which he has been divine, canonized Mormon scripture declares that the Mormon God is the source of all Good in this universe.

This declaration is accompanied in Mormon thought by additional scriptural claims that challenge thesis (i): God is described as corporeal, and then elsewhere described as the life, light, and law of various universes. These paradoxical descriptions invite speculation as to how a corporeal, finite deity can be (and could have become) the source of universal Good. How could a finite entity once subject to the moral whims of another deity become the source of moral value and obligation for the subjects of this particular universe? I argue that Mormons should adopt three controversial metaethical theses to adequately answer this question.

First, Mormon metaethics should entertain a moral anti-realist position: in the Mormon cosmos, there must be no ultimate/transcendent moral truths. The Mormon cosmos must be primordially morally 'empty', so to speak. As such, the gods comprising the infinite regress are *not* (themselves) subject to transcendent moral truths.

Second, Mormon metaethics should append its theory of moral emptiness with a conception of a God who is (i) maximal in perfections and (ii) social in the manifestation and implementation of his perfections. Given the primordial moral emptiness of the cosmos, Mormon theology should entertain the possibility that humanity's moral values and obligations are mediated by God and derivative of an ancestral, communal Goodness coeternal with the infinitely regressing community of gods. Accordingly, each deity is the moral 'hub' – the source of moral phenomena and obligation – in that universe in which they are 'Legislator'.

Third, the Mormon conception of God should include a unique form of voluntarism: specifically, a Zagzebski-inspired motivation-based theory wherein God's motives ground our moral values and obligations.

Further inquiry (vis. Goodness and the gods) and the resolution of various concomitant issues requires investigating the nature of divine finitude as it's presented in Mormon thought.

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Gregory of Nyssa's Solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity

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One solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT) is the Trinitarian theology of Gregory of Nyssa presented in Ad Ablabium. According to Gregory word 'God' is an agent noun similar e.g. to 'rhetor' or 'potter'. God is an agent performing some activity (energeia) of a special type (call it 'godding'). So 'is God' in LPT should be interpreted as 'performs an activity of godding'. Gregory also suggests a non-standard principle of counting agents: x and y are the same agent iff x and y perform the same actions. Since God is some kind of agent and, according to the doctrine of inseparable operations, Persons of the Trinity perform all actions ad extra together, it follows that Persons are the same God.

Branson (2014) proposed a formalization of this solution of LTP and proved its consistency. My goal is to make it resistant to certain philosophical and theological objections and to reflect Gregory's thought even more accurately.

Firstly, I propose to formalize 'is God' by referring not to action (energeia) but to the power (dynamis) to act. It would be wrong to claim that God cannot be God before he acts towards the world. This change does not significantly affect the logic of the solution. The Father is God because he has the power to act divinely – so does the Son and the Spirit.

Secondly, I propose that the criterion of agent identity refers not, as Branson wants, to the existence of a single act of 'godding' shared by the Persons of the Trinity, but to having all actions in common. This criterion allows more than one divine action, and fits better with Gregory's text. Moreover, it seems less ad hoc because it is similar to the identity criteria referring to the identity of causal roles proposed by e.g. Mumford (2003).

Thirdly, contrary to Branson, I propose to distinguish between actions (energeia) and their effects (ergon). Making this distinction allows to make the unity of action stronger or weaker, depending on the interpretation of Gregory's text.

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Referential Opacity and the Communicatio Idiomatum

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Recent scholarship – most notably by Christopher Beely – has brought into sharper focus the essential role of the *communicatio idiomatum* (CI) in Christological history. The CI is "a pattern of cross-predication" according to which the second person of the Trinity is the true subject of *all* statements that predicate properties of (or ascribe actions to) *either* Christ *qua* human nature or Christ *qua* divine nature (see Beely 2016). To put it more clearly, "in ordinary language all the properties of a subject are predicated of its person; consequently the properties of Christ's two natures must be predicated of his one person, since they have only one subject of predication" (Maas 1908).

There are theological differences, some along denominational lines, with respect to the legitimacy of *cross-nature* predication. These differences have played important roles in the miaphysite controversies as well as the development of divergent Eucharistic metaphysics. For present purposes, however, I will entirely bracket the issue of cross-nature predication. My focus, instead, will be on a class of predicative statements where the "standard" CI appears not to apply: statements that predicate into a *referentially opaque context* (ROC). A ROC is a linguistic context in which the substitution of one co-referring expression for another does not guarantee that the statement will retain its truth-value. Consider the following:

1. Meta-Linguistic Expressions
   a. "Jesus was so-named at birth by Mary and Joseph." (TRUE)
   b. "The second person of the Trinity was so-named at birth by Mary and Joseph." (FALSE)
2. Intensional Expressions
   a. "Thomas doubted that Jesus is divine." (TRUE)
   b. "Thomas doubted that God is divine." (FALSE)
   Lest it be objected that these examples involve "extrinsic" properties to which the CI was never intended to apply, there is at least one more type of ROC to consider:
3. Modal Expressions
   a. *Legitimate Inference*: "The human nature of Christ is composed of matter" (TRUE) therefore "The person of Christ is composed of matter" (TRUE).

b. *Illegitimate Inference*: "Necessarily, the human nature of Christ is composed of matter" (TRUE), therefore "Necessarily, the person of Christ is composed of matter" (FALSE).

There are, to be sure, already a variety of "exception" cases to the CI. Most of them involve statements that either subtly insinuate heresies (such as Arianism or Nestorianism) or which amount to a denial of the hypostatic union in the first place (such as "the divine nature did not die therefore Christ did not die"). To the best of my knowledge, however, no similar exceptions for ROCs have yet been recognized.

There are two main lessons here. First, although the orthodox systematic theologian should obviously abjure monophysitism, the claim that there is "no confusion" between Christ's two *natures* does not imply that there is "no confusion" in Christ's *modal profile* owing to the union of these two natures. Second, any application of the doctrine of appropriations to the second person of the Trinity must exercise great caution in any context resembling the examples I have given above.

Descartes on the Ground of Necessity

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Descartes' views on modality are among the most discussed by his commentators in the past decades. A significant part of this discussion concerns Descartes' grounding thesis. This is Descartes' thesis that logical possibility and necessity are grounded in God's volition. According to Descartes, the dependence of modality on God's free will entails that God could have made contradictions true. This is, in a nutshell, Descartes' doctrine of the creation of eternal truths. On the seemingly harmless assumption that some state of affairs ϕ can be brought about if and only if ϕ is logically possible, the claim that God could have made contradictions true seems to entail the logical possibility of the logically impossible. Unsurprisingly, Descartes' doctrine has been called 'strange' (Jolley, 1990: 32), 'incoherent' (Geach, 1973: 10), and 'absurd' (Conant, 1992: 163). In this paper, I will offer an interpretation of Descartes' doctrine that is neither incoherent nor absurd. I will argue that the word 'could' is equivocal in

Descartes' creation doctrine. It can be understood either logically, as in the assertion that God made it the case that contradictories could not be true together. Or it can be understood in relation to God's will itself, as in the assertion that God could have made contradictions true. Not only does this interpretation solve the difficulties that the creation doctrine is usually thought to generate, but it is also better integrated into the core of Descartes' metaphysical and theological views than any of the alternatives.

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Standard Identity and Relative Identity in the Context of the Institution of the Eucharist

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As Beall, Rea, Van Inwagen, and others have noted in some of their works in analytic theology, one problem presented by fundamental theological doctrines, such as the Incarnation and the Trinity, is the problem of identity. The reason for this is the following. Both the doctrine of the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity affirm that things that differ in some respects are identical.

For example, the doctrine of the Trinity establishes the identity of three persons having different characteristics, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, with one God. The problem is that if the three persons are identical to one God, this implies that they are identical to each other. But they have different and even contradictory characteristics. Therefore, these three persons are identical and not identical simultaneously. This case seems to imply a contradiction, and contradictions, for many people, are problematic.

The Eucharist understood as a real presence, poses the same problem. In the Greek words of the institution of the Eucharist,

- Τοῦτόἐστιντὸσῶμάμου / This is my body.

- τοῦτογάρἐστιντὸαῗμάμου / This is my blood.

The linguistic particle ἐστιν establishes an identity relationship between two demonstratives: the object signaled through the demonstrative "this" – the bread in Jesus' hands – and what he calls "my body" and the demonstrative "this" – the wine in Jesus' hands – and what he calls "my blood." This suggests a relationship of identity between things with no shared characteristics except location (where the wafer is, there is the body of Christ). As in the Incarnation and the Trinity case, this seems to imply a contradiction. Since the contradiction that arises involves an identity relationship that does not seem to accommodate the standard notion, the idea of solving this problem by proposing a theory of identity seems well-motivated.

The general intention of this talk is to give an account of the relationship between the bread and body of Christ in terms of a notion of identity that allows us to understand the identity between things that have (almost) no characteristics in common. I aim to show that the conditions of identity in the Eucharist make this a notion that contradicts Leibniz's *Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals*, also known as Leibniz's Law (LL), and to propose an explanation of the identity relation that is implied here in terms of the RIT.

To this end, in the first part of my presentation, I determine the logical problem of the Eucharist and present the reasons that motivate an identity solution to this problem (i.e., a solution that focuses primarily on the identity relation). In the second part, I introduce a version of the RIT and present some examples in which this is applied. In the third part, I use this theory as a solution to the logical problem of the Eucharist and point out some advantages and disadvantages of this proposal.

The Contradictory God and the BhedābhedaVedānta Tradition

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There has recently been interest from analytic philosophy of religion in the idea of a contradictory God. Although the terminology is not always as precise as it should be (the term "paraconsistent" is often mistakenly used), the thesis that a concept of God may not respect the principle of non-contradiction, thus possessing contradictory attributes, has very important philosophical implications. One concerns the logic behind a given concept of God. If one admits that a given concept of God has contradictory attributes, then there shouldbe some sort of paraconsistent inferential relation able to tolerate some contradictions without trivializing the theory. A second implication, which relates to the first one, has to do with the role of this idea of a contradictory God in the philosophical debate about the rationality of theistic belief, since the principle of non-contradiction is an essential criterion in evaluating the philosophical feasibility of a given concept of God (concepts of God that have contradictory attributes, for example, are generally rejected as philosophically untenable). A third implication concerns the philosophical reconstruction of different religious traditions that seem to offer contradictory descriptions of God; they may in principle benefit from the philosophical contributions made within the debate on the contradictory God.

A number of the Indian religious traditions that aline themselves with Vedānta (a methodologically exegetical school of thought focused on India's earlier scriptural texts) present contradictory descriptions of the ultimate reality, named Brahman. One of the most extreme of such descriptions, which concerns the very nature of Brahman, appears in the BhedābhedaVedānta tradition, which asserts that Brahman is simultaneously identical with (abheda) and different from (bheda) the world and individual beings. While most BhedābhedaVedānta thinkers attempt to explain away this contradiction, asserting, for example, that Brahman is identical with individual beings in a certain sense, but different from them in a different sense, JīvaGosvāmī, a 15th-century BhedābhedaVedāntin, accepts the contradiction, asserting that it is

inconceivable (acintya). Jīva argues that that ultimate reality, which he understands to be personal – in a similar way to the general concept of Godusually understood by Western philosophers –, is simultaneously identical with and different from both the world and individual beings. Our purpose in this lecture is to examine the Acintya Bhedābheda tradition of Jīva in order to take the first steps towards a philosophical reconstruction of the concept of God present in that tradition. A second purpose is to see what lessons can be drawn from Jīva'sAcintyaBhedābheda tradition with regard to the two remaining issues mentioned above, namely what kind of logic lies behind a contradictory concept of God and what could be the role of a contradictory God in the debate on the rationality of theistic belief.

The Problem of Not Being God: Acceptance and the Status of Moral Reasons

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Sharon Street has identified a strategy to find, in her own words, the 'non-holy grail' of metaethics[2], a view that does not involve any metaphysical or epistemological mystery which nevertheless vindicates moral objectivity. This constructivist strategy aims to identify a problem faced by every agent precisely in virtue of their own evaluative perspective. Street claims that the solution to this problem is an ethical standpoint which can vindicate moral objectivity. In summary, Street's universal problem is that being a finite valuer who inevitably has at least some normative reasons is to be vulnerable to loss. And devasting loss is indeed a problem for any finite agent. For example, as valuers, we are invested in how the world turns out and what happens to us and those we love. The more invested and high-aiming an agent, the more vulnerable an agent is to the problem of vulnerability to unmitigated loss, whether or not agents are aware of the problem.

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[2]   Sharon Street, 'Finite Valuers and the Problem of Vulnerability to Unmitigated Loss', in *Normativity and Agency: Themes from the Philosophy of Christine M. Korsgaard*, ed. Tamar Schapiro, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, and Sharon Street (Oxford University Press, 2022).

I argue, however, that Street's problem is reducible to what I call 'The problem of not being God'. In short, the problem of not being God is that a finite agent who is indeed vulnerable to unmitigated loss cannot make themselves invulnerable which is only possible if they were God. I develop an idea of perfect omnipotence and being the perfectly omnipotent being that God is, does not encounter Street's problem. It is only by being God one can become invulnerable to unmitigated loss. The problem of not being God is still there even if God does not exist because the problem is centred on the limitations of finite agents. Granting that Street has indeed located a universal problem, the upshot is that if Street's problem is reducible to the problem of not being God, then we still have a universal problem faced by all finite agents which is also applicable to gods and fictional entities.

If Street's problem is reducible to the problem of not being God and especially if there is no God, there is only one universal answer: acceptance. For any finite agent, no matter how megalomaniac they may be, it is a matter of fact that they are not God and so when faced with the problem of not being God, there is indeed only one solution to this problem: acceptance that one is not God. There isn't anything extravagant when I endorse acceptance: acceptance that you made a mistake, acceptance of your limitations, acceptance of your mortality and those you love, acceptance that pain, failure, and suffering are inevitable, acceptance that the world is not how you would wish it to be. What is so simple and straightforward about the problem of not being God is that it makes the solution just as simple. The solution is acceptance despite how hard that might be.

If it is true that the only solution is acceptance, then the only standpoint which could be universal is also one of acceptance. Acceptance could lead to an agent rediscovering moral reasons, but it is intuitive that acceptance is not by itself going to give any agent moral reasons who did not have them in the first place and especially if that agent only had reasons to torture others, for example. The problem is that a standpoint of acceptance does not explain how all agents have moral reasons.

Ultimately, by her own understanding of objectivity, Street is aiming to capture moral reasons which apply to everyone in light of their own evaluative perspective. And for Street's attempt to be successful, it must work in all cases which I show that it does not. Even if acceptance is the universal standpoint everyone ought to have, this standpoint nevertheless does not necessarily have any bearing on the objectivity of moral reasons because acceptance is simply an acceptance of reality.

My conclusion is that even if the constructivist can identify a universal problem as well as a universal solution to that problem and even if that solution is from an ethical standpoint, that does not necessarily have a bearing on capturing objectivity in ethics, at least not in any way that matters.

Mackie and Plantinga on the Compatibility between the Existence of God and Evil

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In theological discourse, a noteworthy exchange between J. L. Mackie and Alvin Plantinga revolves around the compatibility of God's existence with the existence of moral evil. In his seminal work, "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955), Mackie formulated the logical problem of evil arguing that the coexistence of evil and God creates a logical inconsistency, thus challenging the rationality of theistic beliefs. In response, Plantinga developed the freewill defense, aiming to demonstrate a plausible explanation for why God permits evil, attributing it to the free choices of human beings. Both Mackie and Plantinga concur that God's omnipotence is restricted to logically possible actions, and any inability to perform actions that involve logical contradictions does not undermine God's omnipotence. Mackie subscribes to a compatibilist understanding of freedom and asserts that there is no inherent contradiction in God creating beings with free will who unfailingly choose what is morally right. He considers an individual's freedom is intertwined with their nature, which is created by God, and can be orchestrated in a way that inclines them solely towards righteous actions while retaining their free will. The existence of evil in a world where God cannot create such creatures implies an inherent incompatibility between them. Conversely, Plantinga leans towards a libertarian conception of freedom and argues that while creating the type of beings proposed by Mackie may be a logical possibility, it cannot be guaranteed that individuals will always choose what is right due to the nature of free will. To support his position, Plantinga presents his notion of possible world semantics, contending that not all possible worlds can be actualized, and a world featuring moral good without moral evil falls into the category of unachievable possibilities.

I maintain that if freedom is considered a greater good due to its capacity to allow for moral goodness or the development of greater good, I am inclined towards Plantinga's perspective on free will. The proposition of ensuring only good actions occur would hinder humans from making genuine choices and imply direct interference by God in human freedom, this contradict the notion of freedom that I endorse.

Dialethic Mysteries and the Doctrine of the Trinity

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Recently, we have proposed an account of the notion of religious mystery on which religious mysteries are contradictions (author(s), forthcoming). Our proposal builds on recent work, particularly by Jc Beall (2019a, 2021), defending theological truth-value gluts. We hold that there is a particular use of the word 'mystery' at play in the Christian tradition at least, for which a glutty analysis is appropriate. We have further argued that there are advantages to a glutty treatment of the notion of a religious mystery generally over an approach which identifies specific contradictions in theology on a case-by-case basis. This leads to a contradictory-friendly theology quite different from Beall's. In this paper, we build on this account, but applying it to a specific religious mystery, the doctrine of the Trinity. We contrast our account with other extant accounts of the Trinity.

In the Roman Catholic tradition, we find a clear commitment to the existence of revelational mysteries. Such a commitment was confirmed, for example, at the First Vatican Council:

If any one says that in Divine Revelation there are contained no mysteries properly so called (*vera et proprie dicta mysteria*), but that through reason rightly developed (*per rationem rite excultam*) all the dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated from natural principles: let him be anathema (Session. III, *On Faith and Reason*, can. i).

So what are the mysteries? Again, in the Catholic tradition, the doctrine with the clearest support for classification as a mystery is the doctrine of the Trinity. For example, we find this in the 1992 Catholic Catechism:

The Trinity is a mystery of faith in the narrow sense, that is, one of the mysteries hidden in God, "which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known." God certainly left some traces of His Trinitarian Being in His work of creation and in His Revelation in the course of the Old Testament. But the intimacy of His Being, as of the Holy Trinity, before the Incarnation of the Son of God and the mission of the Holy Spirit, constituted a mystery inaccessible to reason alone and even to the faith of Israel (Catechism of the Catholic Church 237).

The Catechism does not further define this "narrow sense" of the word 'mystery', but we do find this in the New Catholic Encyclopedia

Supernatural Mysteries in the Strict Sense. Those truths that cannot be known without revelation and that, even after revelation, remain obscure to us by reason of the sublimity of their object are supernatural mysteries in the strict sense. Three principal mysteries are normally recognized as belonging to this class:

(1) the Trinity (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum [Freiburg 1963] 3225), which is the mystery of the communication of divine life within the Godhead;

(2) the Incarnation (ibid. 2851), which is the supreme supernatural communication of the divine life to a created nature; and

(3) the elevation of finite persons to share, through grace or glory, in the divine life (ibid. 2854)(New Catholic Encyclopaedia 84).

We take this as our starting point for our analysis of the notion of a religious mystery. Ultimately, we arrive at the following conditions on religious mysteries:

(D1) Religious mysteries can be true.

(D2) Religious mysteries can be known.

(D3) Religious mysteries cannot be known if they are not revealed.

(D4) The reason religious mysteries cannot be known unless revealed has to do with the nature of their content, which means that they are in principle not candidates for human knowledge, absent revelation, *and* remain "obscure" even when revealed.

We have argued (Johnston and Molto forthcominga), that the best candidates for religious mysteries in this sense are true dialetheia, that is true contradictions. This is because dialetheia provide the best explanation of why (D3) and (D4) hold of religious mysteries. We have also argued elsewhere (Johnston and Molto forthcomingb) that if there are true contradictions, we would not be able to know them (divine revelation aside), at least on popular glutty accounts such as Beall's (2010), which features a contraposing conditional, about which we will have more to say. We now check how this fares as an account of the Trinity in particular. We compare our account with the others on the market. We offer new responses to some of the objections that have been raised against glutty theology.

Of God Who Comes to Mind: Augustine, Aquinas and Levinas on the (In)consistency of Divine Attributes

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This presentation reevaluates the major discussion concerning the notion of divine attributes in history and whether the concept of God can be reduced into humans' mind. Three prominent philosophers of Religion, Augustine, Aquinas and Levinas shed additional light on the issue of (in)consistency of divine attributes juxtaposing their views on whether transcendental divine attributes can be reduced into immanence. On the one hand, Augustine references his heart's disquietude that will not find rest until it finds it in God. For Augustine to be an I to himself already presupposes that God is a you to him, and indeed that Augustine is a you to God. Thus, an individual person is preconditioned by his prior and more basic status as a person-in-relation to God. Augustine gives particular importance to consciousness in which person is given a more dynamic interpretation as a self-transcendent being which iscapable of participating in the world of Platonic ideal Forms. On the other hand, Aquinas contends that whatever human beings think of, derives from divine Spirit's infinite mind. In other words, human language expresses divine thought only through the mind. The Absolute divine Spirit has no other way to reveal itself, but through human condition: "In God, understanding (knowing) and being are the same". Levinas, however, raised objections to both views by defending that God's substance as well as His divine attributes are ineffable towards human condition as the only way to understand God is by His trace, that is the other person.

Thus, the purpose of my talk is to reconsider the relation of human beings to God, as to whether they can stand on their own, sufficient to themselves, or they are necessarily in need of God to know what it is to be human and finite.

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A Formal Reconstruction of Ibn Sīnā's "Proof of the Sincere"

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Avicenna's argument for the existence of God, who is Necessary Existent is a prototype of many arguments for the existence of God known in European and Eastern philosophy. We reconstruct the argument from `al-Najat', formalize it, and show its conclusiveness. A key assumption underlying Avicenna's approach is the distinction between distributive and collective collections. Our formalism is based on a fragment of the unitary theory of individuals and sets, where these two types of sets are considered. In the next step, we also prove that God is simple, assuming that He is unique. Then we show that God is the efficient cause of every contingent existent. Finally, we prove the consistency of our theory by constructing its model.

Incompatible and Incomparable Perfections: Toward a New Argument Against Perfect Being Theism

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Traditionally, God has been epitomized as "the greatest possible being." In other words, God is the being such that none greater can exist. What makes a being "greater" is the possession of some property – a great-making property or perfection – that increases its possessor's intrinsic value, that is, the value a being has in and of itself (qua object). Therefore, those who title God "the greatest possible being" affirm that God is the perfect being, the being which has at least some perfections perfectly, that is, in the best way a being could have them. This view is what some have called Perfect Being Theism (PBT), the view that being perfect is to be God and that the perfect being exists.

Inclusivist PBT (IPBT) says that, necessarily, being perfect consists in having all perfections perfectly. On the other hand, exclusivist PBT (EPBT) denies IPBT, adding the clause that being perfect consists in having the best combination of compatible perfections (Nagasawa 2017). One reason to prefer EPBT over IPBT is the threat of incompatibility: either IPBT is true or there are incompatible perfections. Some philosophers have argued persuasively that there are incompatible perfections. Thus, this puts a heavy burden on the theist's hands, heavy enough for some to justify the denial of IPBT and endorsement of EPBT.

Another threat is what I call the problem of incomparability. Two properties, A and B, are incomparable if and only if it is false that either possession of A is better than possession of B, possession of B is better than possession of A, or possession of A is equally good as possession of B (Chang 1997). My attempt in this paper is to argue for two claims. First, if there are incompatible and incomparable perfections, then EPBT is false. Using basic combinatorics, I argue that n number of incompatible perfections yields n number of combinations each of which, assuming that the perfections under discussion are also incomparable, is not better than another nor equally good to another. If so, then there is no best combination of perfections and, therefore, EPBT is false.

The second claim I argue for is that it is reasonable to believe that there are incompatible and incomparable perfections. Here, I use two strategies to argue my case. First, I appeal to our value intuitions, pointing out (as many realists have) that our intuitions about value are a reliable source of knowledge and, therefore, truth.

Second, I apply what has been called "the small-improvements argument" (Chang 2002) to the case of perfections to show that pairs of perfections that have been argued to be incompatible are also incomparable.

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Denial and (In)consistency in Apophatic Traditions

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Monotheistic apophatic philosophers (e.g., Pseudo-Dionysus, Meister Eckhart, Maimonides, and AbūḤātim), the *Upaniṣads*, and the *Laozi* put forward the divine (God, Brahman, or Dao) or divine attributes as ineffable. However, they do so through utterable sentences that contain negations. For example, *God is not evil and not not evil*, *Brahman is not this and not that*, and *the dao that is called 'dao' is not dao*. Under a typical logical analysis, such sentences give rise to contradictions with the structure of $\sim P \wedge \sim \sim P$, in which P is a proposition. In addressing such contradictions, logicians are driven towards accepting paraconsistent positions (allowing for glutty (true and false) propositions) or paracomplete positions (allowing for gappy (neither true nor false) propositions). Such positions depend on interpreting the negation of apophatic traditions as propositional, in which the negation takes scope over an entire proposition and indicates its falsity.

I argue that the use of negation and double negation within these traditions establishes a denial that preserves the (presupposition of the) existence of the divine while indicating that an utterance or mention of the divine is incorrect. In so doing, I suggest that this denial is non-propositional and concords with analyses of metalinguistic negations by Horn, denegations by Searle and Krifka, denials by Priest, and weak rejections by Incurvati and Schlöder. In so doing, I reject a reading of the divine as inconsistent and suggest that apophatic traditions utilize denials to show the impropriety of non-propositional issues (e.g., a category mistake) regarding an utterance or mention of the divine or divine attributes.

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Antinomy of Divine Essence? Essence, Energies, and the Metaphysics of Powers

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The Church Fathers distinguished between the unknowable divine essence and knowable divine energies (Bradshaw 2004). This distinction, systematized by St. Gregory Palamas, plays a key role in modern Orthodox theology (Pino 2023). It is sometimes said that this distinction is antinomic and supports the paraconsistent interpretation of the logic of orthodoxy (Lourie 2014).

I will try to interpret this distinction in terms of contemporary analytic discussions in the metaphysics of powers. Some believe, like David Lewis, that properties and powers are distinct and therefore their relation is contingent, while others, such as John Hawthorne, believe that this relation is necessary since properties are reducible to powers.

It seems that the Church Fathers believed that essence and energies are related necessarily, but at the same time, they firmly believed that the divine essence is nevertheless unknowable. Therefore, Church Fathers adopted the view that essences and energies are at the same time distinct and necessarily related. A similar view in the metaphysics of powers can be found in the late works of Sydney Shoemaker.

I argue that there is nothing particularly inconsistent about this view. Church Fathers merely rejected the principle of identity of necessarily coextensive attributes. Hyperintensionality, however, does not entail paraconsistency.

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Between Speaking and Not Speaking of God:
A Reflection on Maimonides's and Derrida's
Via Negativa

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Not being able to speak in a positive and affirmative manner is different from not being able to speak at all, especially when the subject of our speech and knowledge is God. To some extent, conceptualising a subject, or at least certain key attributes of it, is a prerequisite for putting the subject into a grammatically acceptable, intelligible, and thus communicable sentence. However, it is not easy, or even possible, to incorporate the Judeo-Christian God as a concept into our written and oral language. This paper serves as a preliminary investigation of the negative theology of the Jewish theologian and philosopher Moses Maimonides in his *Guide of the Perplexed*. I will focus primarily on the neo-Platonic character and epistemological significance of the Maimonidean *Via Negativa* (i.e., the negative way). I will then examine how this line of thought is critically received and developed by the postmodern thinker Jacques Derrida, who argues that an apophatic negation does not necessarily lead to a void of speech or a suspension of knowledge. Rather, it is in and through the invocation of God ("a prayer," in Derrida's sense) that the language of humanity gains a stance beyond conceptualising and an existential horizon that simultaneously orients us towards the ineffable divine and secures the freedom to pursue our faith.

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ARGUMENTATION IN WORLD RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS, INCLUDING LEGAL TRADITIONS

Organiser: **Agnieszka Rostalska**, Ghent University,
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     #tab-1

Formalized approaches to philosophical argumentation, conducted in specific genres of debate, were developed in most World Religious Traditions, and are not at all exclusively distinctive of "Western" philosophical disputation.

This workshop, part of the 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion, explores cross-cultural perspectives on argumentation, specifically, those that governed how different traditions engaged in philosophical debates.

The papers, of which some combine comparative and/or cross-cultural components, will discuss the following topics:

- Argumentation – the epistemic standards of rational reflection;
- Application of argumentative techniques for understanding religious phenomena;
- Formal approaches to philosophico-religious arguments: especially the frameworks of inference, suppositional reasoning, parallelism, deductive reasoning, logical fallacies, contradictions and debate;
- Techniques for defending/challenging/persuading (including misleading an opponent) in situations of doubt or disagreement, especially: certification, persuasion, refutation, and trickery in debate;
- Comparison – differences and commonalities in argumentative practices across cultures.

The participants will inquire into how the relations between logic and religion are supported by rational inquiry. They will scrupulously examine a wide range of arguments postulated by philosophers and logicians.

Empirical Arguments for God in the Hebrew Scriptures

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The Hebrew Scriptures openly adopt an empiricist religious epistemology which leaves their claims susceptible to disconfirmation by historical and archaeological research. The Hebrew Scriptures not only contain historiographical accounts of miraculous events; they also directly utilize these events theologically, discrediting foreign gods as impotent in comparison with the observably active God of Israel. Accordingly, Elijah is described as performing a kind of public experiment on Mount Carmel, demonstrating the reality and power of the God of Israel and the unreality and impotence of Baal (I Kings 18). Some claim that it would be anachronistic to assume these texts were meant to be read as historically accurate, since their composition predates Thucydides "invention of scientific history." However, they were written in the light of a different, but no less critical, epistemic practice: the overseeing of contracts. Even societies which have not developed any notion of "scientific" truth in their historiography or writings on nature need some notion of objective legal truth and methods of ascertaining that truth in order to enforce contracts. Biblical historiography, including the miracle-filled narratives of the Exodus, the wanderings in the wilderness, and the conquest of Canaan, is covenantal; it records the process of consent to the covenantal contract between Israel and the God of Israel and the checkered history of its implementation. Thus, it subjects itself to legal norms of factuality. Those norms are strong enough to leave it open to the threat of disconfirmation by contemporary historical and archaeological research.

The Order of Arguments in the Early Vedic Exegetical Tradition and the Role of Polysemy

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Mīmāṃsā as the Vedic exegetical tradition worked out various interpretative mechanisms that would translate the Vedic sentences and passages into coherent and meaningful ritual, and later also moral, instructions. Mīmāṃsā specialists thus conducted analyses of verbal messages with particular objective in mind, which made all their deliberations structured and regular. That came useful in their subsequent theological and philosophical endeavours. One of the most focused and organized thinker of the early and classical Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, followed in his argumentation an ordered exchange of claims and counterclaims, repeated then and again in many of his discussions (or at least in his main preserved commentaries on the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the Śabarabhāṣya, namely the Ślokavārttika and Tantravārttika), usually following the sequence of epistemological pramāṇas. Within the domain of religious and legal knowledge (see the Tantravārttika) he would also refer to the social reality and would use social facts as arguments for his standpoint. One of the often present applied argumentative technique was usage of polysemy, usually introduced in the debate with the obvious purpose of creating space for definitional clarifications. In this paper based on the material from the Tantravārttika (with some reference to the Ślokavārttika too) I will point out the typical order of argument domains (perception, authoritative speech, inference, analogy etc.) used by Kumārila, first of all in his religious and legal discussions, focusing on the role of playing with polysemy there.

How not to Argue? A Disagreement on Ancient Indian Methods of Argumentation

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This paper focuses on techniques for defending, challenging, and persuading (including misleading an opponent) in situations of doubt or disagreement. As attested by Indo-Tibetan manuals on engaging in debates, Ancient Indian formalized approaches to philosophical argumentation included topics such as the employment of persuasion, refutation, and trickery in a debate.

As recommended by Nyāya philosophers, in some circumstances, fallacious reasoning might serve as legitimate means to win in a debate. Buddhist philosophers, most notably Dharmakīrti in a treatise Vādanyāya ["The Logic of Debate"], strongly voiced their disagreement with the usage of scheming methods. He emphasizes that the purpose of a debate is to get one closer to truth, and not to one's victory.

In my presentation, I examine the original features of Dharmakīrti work:

1. a novel typology of debates and
2. a revised concept of a 'ground for defeat' or 'check' (nigrahasthāna).

Next, I juxtapose Dharmakīrti's refined notion of a check with the one assumed by the Nyāya thinkers. As my comparative analysis will demonstrate, this disagreement concerning rules for debates was not a consequence of varying classifications of debates nor a definition of a 'check.' I argue that instead, the controversy followed from differing goals of the debate assumed by the two parties in the first place. Moreover, I propose that Nyāya philosophers could have responded to Dharmakīrti's reproach by pointing to their definition of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) and, subsequently, to their requirements for a trustworthy testifier.

Religious Tradition, Argumentation and Testimonial Knowledge

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My goal in this paper is to provide an analysis of the argumentation based on a religious tradition starting from the case of testimonial knowledge. A believer accepts a lot of propositions about the world and life based on statements that are taken as testimonies of people who have an exemplary status. The circumstances in which these opinions are formed are exceptional, they ensure a strong trust, and the confessions are accepted beyond any doubt. What is the epistemic status of these testimonies, how do they become part of a chain of arguments and how do we validate various claims of knowledge, are just some of the problems of constructing arguments based on testimonies. In my research I will develop an epistemological analysis of arguments based on testimonial knowledge that are elaborated in the context of a religious tradition and presuppose previous epistemic commitment in relation to a religious faith. The problem is not only an analysis of faith in terms of well-founded beliefs, but also the construction of the argumentative chain so that the conviction of the other can be obtained.

Conflict between Scripture and Inference in Argumentation: A Comparison of Nyāya and Mādhva-Vedānta in Medieval India

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The purpose of this presentation is to analyze the framework of argumentation and the qualities of its members based on the differences in their philosophical positions through a comparison of the argumentation theories of the Nyāya and Vedānta schools in medieval India. The presenter has been studying the argumentation chapter of Nyāya works such as Bhaṭṭa Jayanta'sNyāyamañjarī ("A Cluster of Flowers of Logic," ca. 9-10c.) and the Vedānta works on argumentation such as Kathālakṣaṇa ("[A Collection of Concise] Definitions of Argumentation") by Mādhva (ca. 13c), the founder of the Mādhva-Vedānta, while also considering the contrast with Buddhist logic. The inferential formula consisting of several components (avayava) is undoubtedly the basic building block of argumentation in the framework of medieval Indian argumentation theory, formed mainly by Buddhists and the Nyāya school. However, differences in the views of the various philosophical schools led to questions about the strength-weakness relationship between scripture (or testimony, āgama/śabda) and inference (anumāna) as means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), or which should be the primary basis in an argument. In fact, the Mādhva school of theorists seemed to have aspired to build their arguments based on the scriptures, while keeping in mind the argumentative doctrines of the Nyāya school and paying considerable attention to inferential/dialectical fallacies. Interestingly, while being aware of the qualities of the adjudicator in the courts, which are referred to in the Dharma literature, there are also dogmatic modifications, such as a call for a certain kind of faith. By analyzing mainly the works of the Nyāya school, such as Varadarāja'sSārasaṃgraha, and the Vedānta school, such as Kathālakṣaṇa, this study will focus on the relationship between scripture and reasoning in argumentation to identify similarities and differences in the way they construct philosophical arguments.

God, Existence and Privation: Fārābī and the Logic of Theological Propositions

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In his discussion of God's mode of existence in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas states that when we assert that God exists, we use "exist" not to signify the act of existing (actumessendi), but rather we employ it in a second sense that signifies the truth of a proposition. Accordingly, he argues that such a statement is logically equivalent to statements like "blindness exists," since blindness is actually a lack of existence, but it is true to say that some men are blind (Sum. Theol., I, q. 48, a. 2, ob. 2 ad 2. See also Kenny: 2002; Ventimiglia: 2020). This way of addressing the epistemic status of statements regarding God's existence is not unprecedented in Arabo-Islamic philosophy. Fārābī (d. 950 AD) has argued, well before Aquinas, that the statement regarding God's existence is logically equivalent to statements that signify deprivations such as blindness and voidness. The purpose of this presentation is to explore Fārābī's account of the logical structure of statements regarding God's existence as it occurs within his discussion of the syntactic/semantic constituents of bipartite and tripartite logical sentences, as developed in his Book of Letters (kītāb al-ḥūrūf). In the first part, I will contextualize Fārābī's discussion of the senses of being against its Aristotelian back ground. It is customary for the Aristotelian tradition, following Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics Δ7, to identify four sense of being:

1) being per accidens,
2) being per se,
3) being as truth,
4) being as actuality and potentiality.

However, Fārābī only recognizes two main senses of being: 1) being as true which is a second order property which designates that some concept is instantiated. b) being as what is circumscribed by a quiddity outside the soul (kītāb al-ḥūrūf, §89-90). This account is entirely consistent with Fārābī's position in his Risālahfījawābmasa'ilsu'ila' anhā in which he argues that existence is not a real predicate (Rescher: 1963). In the second section, I will delve into Fārābī's discussion regarding the logical structure of bipartite and tripartite sentences and the semantic differences they entail. Fārābī states that, from a syntactical perspective, bipartite and tripartite sentences can be

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reconstructed in two main interrogative forms: a) Does X exist? b) Does X exist as Y? Since being can be predicated in two ways, he concludes that there are, in general, four forms of propositions (Ibid, § 211- 212).

He then focuses his discussion on propositions regarding God's existence. He argues that since we have no knowledge of God's real essence as a positive and actual being in the world, we are only able to attribute the concept of being to God as a second-order property. When someone asks, "Does God exist?" they are inquiring whether the concept of God is instantiated or, in other words, whether it is the case that God exists. Therefore, he asserts that the proposition "God exists" is logically equivalent to propositions that indicate privations in the world, such as void and blindness. When someone asserts that the void exists, they do not imply the existence of a positive reality outside the world possessing the property of being void. Rather, they simply mean that the concept of void has been instantiated. In the final section, I will examine the potential historical influence of Fārābī's account regarding the logical equivalence of propositions regarding God's existence with propositions signifying deprivation on Latin medieval thought. Fārābī'skītāb al-ḥūrūfwas never translated into Latin, thus there is no direct evidence of Fārābī's account influencing the Latin tradition. However, Fārābī's theory concerning the two main senses of being was known among Latin philosophers through the works of Averroes, who adopted and developed Fārābī's account as a means to interpret Aristotle's discussion of the senses of being in Metaphysics Δ7 (Menn: 2008). I will propose that Fārābī's theory of two senses of being and his concept of truth as a second-order property, as adopted by Averroes, could serve as a potential source of influence on Latin medieval philosophy.

On the Role of Argumentation in Certification

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In this talk I will discuss the relation between certification and argumentation. I will begin by presenting Gangesha's dual disjunctivism about certification and perceptual knowledge. I will then argue that it is better to drop disjunctivism about certification. I will then articulate a contextual account of certification. I will apply this theory to everyday cases to show how it works and how it is superior to contextualism about knowledge. Finally, I will show how a globally informed theory of argumentation that is sensitive to disagreements about the sources of knowledge, as found for example in Indian philosophy, fits well with a contextualist account of certification. I will close by showcasing how contextualism about certification is part of the common core of argumentation theory and should be at the heart of critical thinking education in the global internet age. I will draw some specific connections between certification theory and the dialogical approach to logic.

RELIGION, LOGIC AND AI

Workshop Expert: **Bruno Banelli**
Organisers: **Marcin Trepczyński**,
                     University of Warsaw, and Ines Skelac, University of Zagreb

The development of natural language models gives an opportunity to use AI-chatbots in religious discourse analysis, as well as to test them as possible theologians.

Many practical and philosophical questions arise on these grounds. Let us list out only a few of them. Are such chatbots really helpful in those analyses? Can they be really good logicians (if they don't "know" when they say true sentences) and good theologians (if they are not humans)? Can we train a model to make it operating like Thomas Aquinas (or at least some of his disciples)?

At this workshop we will collect results of such experiments which include both theological and logical perspective.

- Topics may include, but are not restricted to:
- Testing theological and logical skills of AI-chatbots, comparison of different AI-chatbots/AI-models with respect to suchlogical and theological skills,
- advantages of using AI-chatbots in logical analysis of religious discourse (including illustrations),
- methodological and technical conditions, challenges and opportunities for such enterprises.

Chat-GPT, Muslim Cyberspace and the Construction of a Critical Islamic Epistemology

Sheikh Mohamad Farouq

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The emergence of new digital technologies has revolutionized the way information is disseminated, making it easier for people across the globe to communicate and connect instantly. The laissez-faire infrastructure of these tools has also created an unprecedented ecology in which the democratization of information enables anyone to consume and share data regardless of background. It consequently empowers people to share and exchange ideas leading to a plethora of opinions on different subject matters. While information diversity can be seen as a boon to the formation of a more informed public, the 'new media ecology' has unknowingly accelerated the collapse of communication between experts and laypeople by offering a shortcut to erudition. It deceives people by providing an illusion of intellectual triumph by indulging in a limitless supply of information that might not necessarily be factual yet perilously framed as an 'expert opinion'. One of the digital tools blamed for this disruption is the advanced AI chatbot, Chat-GPT.

This paper seeks to explore the implications of generative AI such as Chat-GPT on religious discourse in the Muslim cyberspace. It essentially argues that an unbridled usage of such technologies would expedite an intellectual death and a certain degree of 'epistemic disobedience' is necessary to prevent a technological dystopia and create space for critical reflection on the digital world we are building. The paper further explores how technological advances have altered our language and the way we think of our world today. It contends that modern technology is inherently designed to reach at a hallucinated "singularity" that inverts traditional religious metaphysics in which the many emanate from the One. Moreover, it runs in contrast to the foundation of the Islamic intellectual tradition that is discursive and fosters a culture of ambiguity.

Against this backdrop, the paper proposes the construction of a critical epistemological framework in Islam that establishes an equilibrium between the sacred Texts and our contemporary realities. Additionally, it allows us to discursively engage the epistemological foundations of modern technologies and formulate ethical guidelines to ensure that it is used in a responsible way.

Logos in Debates on Religion: Using AI for Its Analysis and Visualisation

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In this paper, we propose a corpus study and AI-based technology of Argument Analytics for exploration of complex logos structures in debates on social media devoted to religion. By 'logos' we mean structural components of a discourse that encompass not only inferences, but also other propositional relations such as instances of conflict or cases when users rephrase either their own or others' statements. As an illustrative material for our study, we take discussions on Reddit that involve religious issues: (1) the case of religion-rationalised child abuse (a Reddit discussion starting with the post: "We were supposed to wait for God to provide. And that's what we did"), and (2) the case of becoming religious (a Reddit discussion starting with the post: "Why I became religious, and why I like the classic terms"). We create annotated corpus of structured data of the debates, using OVA3: Online Visualisation of Arguments software (Janier et al. 2014). The corpus analysis helps us answer the following research questions: (1) is the discourse on religion different from discussions on other topics discussed on social media in terms of the density of arguments, conflicts and rephrases?; (2) does the discourse on religion differ from other discourse kinds as it comes to the density of ethotic arguments related to users' character and credibility?; and (3) does the discourse on religion differ significantly from other discourse types in terms of level of emotional exchanges? To this end, we develop Argument Analytics technology (Lawrence et al. 2016) that automatically creates statistical summaries and synthesis of logos structures in these debates. Reddit discourse on religion is then compared with the dynamics ofReddit discussions on Covid-19 vaccinations and offline debates in the UK Parliament. The results open a path for designing a fully-fledged methodology to the study of logos in debates about religion.

Navigating Linguistic Distances among European Languages through AI Analysis of the Bible

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Artificial intelligence (AI) is revolutionising all aspects of scientific research, including the humanities and religious sciences. In all its translations, the Bible is the most important source of written and oral language change. However, parts of the languages that are usually not studied by linguists, such as proper names, are also important for understanding language change. Proper names are often excluded from linguistic analyses because they are considered to be arbitrary and meaningless. However, big corpora of proper names can be useful resources of information for language distances. For example, by comparing the frequency of proper names in different languages, it is possible to identify linguistic features that are shared by those languages.

AI is still not much used in analyses of Biblical texts. However, this analysis can shed new light on different theological issues. For example, by comparing the frequency of proper names in different versions of the Bible, it is possible to identify linguistic, logical and theological features that are shared by those versions. This study will use AI to analyse a large corpus of proper names from the Bible in the major European languages. The results of this analysis will be used to shed new light on different theological issues.

Exploring Prompts and Identities for Reasoning About the Existence of God on GPT-4

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With the development of transformer models and self-supervised learning techniques, large language models (LLMs) like Generative Pretrained Transformer (GPT) have been established. As new LLMs, such as GPT-4, were designed, these models began to perform better in many tasks due to increased data and model parameters. Researchers have tested LLMs' capabilities on various complex tasks, such as cognitive tests or comprehension of philosophical paradoxes. In this study, we focus on how it would be possible to make GPT-4 reason about the existence of God using two different methods.

Our first method is the dialectics of multiple identities. Especially when using GPT-4 (via ChatGPT), the model is conditioned to be a chatbot, so it does not respond informatively when asked about personal beliefs. To overcome this limitation, we can assign specific identities like "theist philosopher" or "atheist philosopher" to obtain opinions on different matters like God and religion. By establishing a debate between different identities on philosophical matters, we can help the model reason over different ideas. Our second method involves using a well-known LLM reasoning technique called the chain-of-thought (CoT). In mathematical problems, it has been demonstrated that GPT models perform better when given an example of reasoning for a question, rather than expecting the answer directly. We can apply CoT to construct arguments on the existence of God by introducing new premises constrained by different concepts. We demonstrate early results using various examples. Although our demonstrations do not prove that an LLM model like GPT-4 can function as an independent philosopher, these results indicate that GPT-4 excels in dialectics and creating connections with different concepts to construct arguments.

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Testing Chatbots as Rational Theologians

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In my paper, I would like to present preliminary results of testing selected chatbots based on Artificial Intelligence as possible rational theologians. First, I plan to outline the main assumptions of such a testing, including pointing out theological skills related to logical thinking and benchmarks for each of them, as well as specific materials to be used in such tests. Second, I will show results of preliminary testing of such chatbots as ChatGPT and similar, with respect to interpretation and logical analysis of some theological reasonings. Finally, I will present some ways of improving LLMs (including fine-tuning) in order to get a satisfactory AI theologian.

RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE AND REASONING

Keynote Speaker: **Kordula Świętorzecka**, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw: Gödel's Ontological Argument in a New Context. Research 2020-2023

Organiser: **Marcin Trepczyński**, University of Warsaw

This workshop is devoted to various aspects of argumentation in religious discourse, from formal analysis of proofs of theological statements, to identification of persuasive strategies in religious debates.

The papers should both refer to religious discourse and include logical analysis.

Topics may include, but are not restricted to:

- new insights related to proofs of the existence of God and of other theological statements,
- kinds of argumentation in theological works,
- argumentative strategies in religious debates, including persuasive strategies,
- methodological challenges concerning interpretation of the religious arguments' structure (annotation, diagramming etc.),
- new applications and perspectives of analysing arguments in religious discourse.

Construction, Evaluation and Function of Theological Models – Considerations on a Method of Theological Theory Building

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Model building is a recognized scientific method and helps us to investigate theories, to explain facts in the world or to make predictions about future events. Be it climate models or the standard model of physics, models offer their own valuable approach to the world and are established as a method of scientific reasoning. Modeling has also become established in theology. Models of the Trinity, christological models, or models of interreligious relations are discussed here, for example. For about half a century, the philosophy of science has also been increasingly methodologically interested in model building and has been asking how scientific models work. While this debate in philosophy of science has already been received in some disciplines, methodological and epistemological investigations of theological modeling are rather rare and fragmentary, so that one can speak of the fact that models in theology have not yet been sufficiently investigated. In my presentation, I would like to take this gap as an opportunity to draw broad lines of a program of inquiry into this important theological method. First, I will discuss the question of why theology should engage in model building at all. To do so, I will discuss the added value of models for theological theory building. I will argue for the fact that the study of abstract entities cannot avoid constructing models to test and plausibilize their assumptions. I will then attempt to trace the construction process of theological models. After that, I will argue for the need to extend criteria of evaluation of models in theology beyond general logical criteria such as coherence and consistency to include theological criteria such as adequacy to religious experience or sacred scriptures. After that, I would like to present some functions of theological models such as the explication of doctrines, the plausibilization of religious experiences, or the testing of theories. The concept of reality and truth of theological models are of particular importance because, on the one hand, it is clear that models are subject to further development and in this sense incomplete and provisional and, on the other hand, religious theories and their models always make a certain claim to validity and normativity. Thus, theological models should on the one hand help to make real progress in knowledge and understanding and on the other hand reflect

the perspectivity and limitedness of human thinking about God. Therefore, I would also like to briefly adress the complementary role of models and metaphors and analogies.

A Critical Analysis of Arguments for the Existence of God as a Postulate of Józef Maria Bocheński's Programme of Studies on God

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In the first chapter of *Gottes Dasein und Wesen. Logische Studien zur Summa Theolgiae I, qq. 2-11*, Józef Maria Bocheński (1902-1995) formulates and discusses the programme of studies on God, which ideologically integrates the research presented in this work. This program is a kind of continuation of the programme of the Cracow Circle. Some of the tasks included in the programme of studies on God concern arguments encountered in religious discourse. Within these studies, the subjects of the analysis include the scholastic arguments for the existence of God and the objections that have been formulated against them. This should be done critically, using the means of broadly understood logic (formal logic, logical semiotics, and methodology of science). The aim of the paper is to indicate the role of such analyses in the programme formulated by Bocheński and also to present the way in which he carried out these tasks himself.

The Ontological and Predication-logical Basics of the Difference between God and Deities: Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham

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One of the most debated questions in the high scholastics of the 13-14th centuries is: if we assume something (an entity, which is not an abstraction, but extramental reality) which does not fit into the capacities of our verbal means of expression with language tools to be signified, is nonetheless being signified, what is the meaning of the language signs applied – words (nomen) and propositions (propositio) in that case? The semantical and predicative solution of this issue is the necessary basis for taking this or that (one or another) position concerning numerous theological decisions, including the argument about the difference between 'God' and 'deities'. This is problem within scholastic semantics and predicative logics that is substantially connected to border questions in metaphysics and logics and epistemological arguments involved.

I am going to address this issue in aspect of semantics and predicative logics. The analysis will be made in three steps.

(1) In order to get a possibly close representation of what might be understood in scholastic philosophy under the extensions of the most used terms "God" and "deities", I will approach these words by using scholastic terminology and the methodical apparatus of its application: the concepts significatio, consignificatio, suppositio (s. materialis; s. formalis; s. personalis), modus significandi.

(2) Since the meanings of the words used are best understood contextually and underlay 'verification' and (or?) 'falsification', I am going to propose a contextual analysis according to the rules of scholastic predicative logic taking in account the logical-semantical connection between the subject and the predicate of the proposition (compositio). The selected examples are the most dealt with propositions like: "God is eternity"; "deities are eternal"; "God is omnipotent"; "deities are good".

I am going to perform this analysis on the basis of two conceptually different approaches: (a) using extensional/univocative propositions involving de subiecto-predication perspective, and (b) using intensional/equivocative or analogical statements involving in subiecto-predication perspective.

(3) Analysis (1) and (2a) will allow me to disclose the very nature of this ever actual issue (i) as a problem of religion/theology/metaphysics and logics; (ii) with the tools of predicative logics dealing with univocative, aequivocative and analogical statements, and (iii) in its differentiated interpretations inspired by both – realist and nominalist solutions. I am going to make this analysis on the basis of the relevant statements by two prominent figures of high scholastics: Aquinas and Occam.

A Critique of the Existence of Īśwara (God) in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana

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Udayana, an eminent logician and philosopher of India, around the end of the 10th century, composed a work called Nyāyakusumāñjali (A Bouquet of Flower of Logic) primarily devoted to prove the existence of Iśwara (God). Here, he argues against the atheist schools, prominent among them being Buddhists and Cārvākas (extreme empiricists). The arguments in favour of Iśwara advanced by Udayana are of various kinds: ontological, teleological, moral, based on the authenticity of Scripture (Vedās), based on the origin of Saṁskṛtam language, and so on. In this paper, I attempt to analyze some of the major problems these arguments face in light of objections advanced by Buddhists and Cārvākas. Apparently, it might render readers the impression that the idea of Iśwara is based on a typical instance of creation or construction. However, it's not the case. I intend to examine the arguments presented for and against the existence of Iśwara by the Indian theist school Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the atheist schools, taking the middle ground without any bias or getting embroiled in a dispute. Not surprisingly, we shall see that numerous paradoxes result when we attribute Iśwara with a universal, all-encompassing, transcendent character.

Reasoning in Analytical Biblical Exegesis:
From Langton to Aquinas

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Reasoning in theology is often being associated with systematic theology, in which theologians discuss the most important problems concerning God. However, it turns out that we find a lot of reasonings in the commentaries on the Bible, so in the biblical exegesis (BE). In my paper, I will analyse a few examples of reasoning presented by analytically oriented scholastic theologians: Stephen Langton, Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, to show that their both formulate advanced reasonings in BE and use theory of reasoning as well as logic to identify, reconstruct and analyse reasonings they find in the Bible. It will show that:

1) BE is a domain in which reasoning and its theory plays a very important role (both to better interpret the Scripture and to feed systematic theology);
2) BE provides us with good examples by which we can illustrate well crucial problems with analysing reasoning expressed in natural language (including leading questions, enthymemes, illocutionary force);
3) BE is a good material to test classifications of reasoning, including the one offered by Peirce (deduction, induction, abduction) and that formulated in the Lvov-Warsaw School (deductive: inference, proving; reductive: explanation, testing).

MYTHOS AND LOGOS: SCHOPENHAUER AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Keynote Speaker: **Professor Matthias Koßler**,
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Organiser: **Oliver Brown**, London Metropolitan University, UK

Schopenhauer's philosophy is recognised for its pessimism and engagement with religious thought, particularly Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity. The aim of the workshop is to investigate how Schopenhauer understands the tension between philosophy and religion in his work and what insights his interpretation can offer to contemporary work in philosophy and religious studies.

Submissions on a breadth of topics related to Schopenhauer's philosophy and its relationship with religion are welcome, including but not limited to:

- Philosophy, religion, and metaphysical consolation,
- Narrative and conceptual truth in Schopenhauer,
- Schopenhauer and apophatic theology,
- Pessimistic and optimistic religions,
- Schopenhauer's interpretation of the inner kernel of Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam,
- Tragedy and religious allegory.

Religion and Schopenhauer Diagrams

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In 'The World as Will and Representation' [Schopenhauer] and also in his Berlin Lectures, Arthur Schopenhauer have provided logical diagrams. In these diagrams, a circle is used to represent the extension of a concept (i.e. set of individuals denoted by this concept) and the topological relations between these circles represent the relation between the concepts [Lemanski & Moktefi]. In 'The World as Will and Representation', we also find another type of diagram, called ''Good and Evil diagram', which can be obtain by bringing many circles together and connecting them in a chain like formation. But unlike the diagrams mentioned above, 'Good and Evil' diagram does not show the actual relation between the concepts but just show the path that viewer might take to go from one circle to its non-adjacent circle by 'jumping' one intersecting circle to another. This type of diagram can also help in visualizing Schopenhauer's views on pessimistic religions. Auweelec [Auweele] has summa rized Schopenhauer's view as follows Human beings can be either enlightened or not, but both kinds are tortured and need salvation. The not enlightened mass, through the 'allegorical truth which pessimistic religion provides, understand their deprived condition. Religion also provides them the 'principal' to overcome this situation and gain salvation. The same process happens to the enlightened mass through philosophy. Here I have applied Schopenhauer diagrams to Auweele's interpretation. My talk will start with the diagrams of Schopenhauer and I will delve more into Schopenhauer's view on pessimistic religion and try to provide a diagrammatic dimension to it.

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God and Evil in Schopenhauer, Cioran and Romantic Literature

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Starting from Schopenhauer's hellish version of existence ("there is already in the world something akin to hell... This world is the battle-ground of tormented and agonized beings who continue to exist only by each devouring the other" – WWR §46, "Die Welt isteben*die Hölle,* und die Menschen sindeinerseits die gequältenSeelen und anderseits die Teufel darin." – PP 2 §156), we argue that Schopenhauer's evaluation of the world bears strong similarities with Byron's nihilistic "mystery" *Cain* (1821), influencing another lesser-known gem of Romantic literature, Mihai Eminescu's*Andrei Mureșanu* (1871). Schopenhauer claims that our lives are "meaninglessness" and "vacuous": we are "like mechanical clocks that are wound up and go without knowing why"; every individual is "one more short dream of the infinite spirit of nature", "one more fleeting image jotted playfully" by the will "on its infinite page … before it is erased to free up room" (WWR I §58). Furthermore, the essence of Hamlet's famous monologue can be summarized in this way: "our condition is so miserable that complete non-being would be decidedly preferable" (WWR I §59). Schopenhauer both asserts that non-existence is superior to this infernal and empty existence, and that God cannot be complimented for His unfortunate creation. According to the German philosopher, "this world of constantly needy creatures who continue for a time merelyby devouring one another, pass their existence in anxiety and want,and often endure terrible afflictions, until they fall at last into the arms of death... a God who should presume to transform himself into such a world would certainly have been inevitablytroubled and tormented by the devil" (WWR §28). We argue that Schopenhauer's dissatisfaction with a defective creation and a divinity that possesses demonic traits, leads the way to Cioran's Gnostic and nihilistic reevaluation of God from his *The Evil Demiurge* (1969). TheRomanian-French author, heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, claims that this world is too damaged to be considered divine: it is much more likely that a demonic deity is responsible for its creation. "It is difficult, it is impossible to believe that the Good Lord – "Our Father" – had a hand in the scandal of creation. Everything suggests that He took no part in it, that it proceeds from a god without scruples, a feculent god. Goodness does not create, lacking imagination; it takes imagination to put together a world, however botched. At the very least, there must be a mixture of good and evil in order to produce an action or a work. Or a universe. Considering ours, it is altogether easier to trace matters back to a suspect god than to an honorable one." (*The New Gods,* I).

The Communicability of Compassion and the Limits of Mythos and Logos

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This paper explores Arthur Schopenhauer's account of compassion and assesses the explanatory powers of religion and philosophy in relation to compassion's essence. Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion both respond to humanity's metaphysical need which is driven by the requirement that 'the horizon of our thoughts must be closed, and must not remain unlimited' (PPII, p. 302). In Schopenhauer's dialogue in *On Religion*, Philalethes argues that religions 'appeal not to conviction [...] but to faith, using revelation' (p. 294). Philosophy, on the other hand, has 'its source [...] in the intuitive apprehension of the world' (PPII, p. 12). Its intuitive source grounds Schopenhauer's preference of philosophy to religion.

Contemporary debates have focused on the content of knowledge in accounting for the differences between compassionate, egoistic and malicious actions. Marshall (2017) claims that Schopenhauer attributes epistemic value to compassion which 'implies that malice and egoism can arise only from an epistemic lack' (pp. 293-4). Janaway (2020) specifies that Schopenhauer's ethics is founded upon 'cognition of this truth [that] each human being is not really distinct from the All' (p. 274). Shapshay (2021) and Mannion (2002) attribute pantheism and theism to Schopenhauer's ethics to bridge a supposed motivational gap that arises when viewing the content of compassion as a perception of the truth of monism.

This paper argues that the debate in secondary literature has arisen because of Schopenhauer's careless use of the term "knowledge" in his account of compassion, which he most often uses to refer to representational, cognised knowledge. However, in Schopenhauer's more careful moments, a 'felt knowledge' (WWRI, p. 357) is referenced in contrast to 'abstract knowledge, communicable through words' (p. 368) when he attempts to define that which is specific to compassionate experience. This notion of a felt, non-representational "knowledge" evidences Schopenhauer's emphasis on the primacy of the will, and characterology, in ethics. Schopenhauer claims that 'conduct follows from absolute necessity from the coincidence of the character with the motives' (WWRI, p. 287). Hence, an egoist and a compassionate agent can have the same representative content – another suffering individual – but the egoist lacks the compassionate agent's deep incentive to remove another's suffering due to his distinct intelligible character.

Considering this, the compassionate agent 'performs such a deed because he is good, but he does not understand how to explain it properly, since he is not a philosopher' (p. 369). This sets up a direct contrast between the mode of communication of the philosopher – an explanation in abstract concepts – and the immediate feeling of the compassionate agent, or *what it is like to be compassionate*. This 'living knowledge expressing itself in deed and conduct alone' (p. 285) is a direct and first-personal 'felt knowledge' of compassion. It is only the shadow of this that the philosopher seeks to explain in third-personal abstract terms.

Religion utilises *mythos* to convey the metaphysical significance of morality. For example, Schopenhauer takes the Upanishadic formula, *tat tvamasi* to ground compassion in the individual's ultimate identity with the other sufferer. However, because one must *be in possession of* a compassionate intelligible character to experience the felt knowledge of compassion, any third-personal philosophical account of compassion cannot have its source in intuition. Therefore, just as religion cannot explain compassion accurately due to its reliance on myth and allegory, philosophy cannot properly explain compassion since its explanation is not grounded upon intuition.

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Reflections of Some Early Acceptations of the "Kunstreligion" in Arthur Schopenhauer's Work

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The presentation is dedicated to the reconsideration of perspectives concerning the religiousness of art formulated in the late Eighteenth Century and the early Nineteenth century – among others by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1799), Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1799, posthumously edited by Johann Ludwig Tieck), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1807) – in order to outline their relationship with and developments in Schopenhauer's thought. A particular attention will be dedicated to properly logical aspects of the subject, to the acknowledgment of absence/presence of conceptual referents in the purely instrumental music and to the definitions of signification in different artistic contexts. The diachronic observation of the contributions on the subject up to Schopenhauer's reconsideration allows to detect a relevant deepening moving from a Christian character of the conception of art. The research may also lead to more closely relate positions exposed in the early Nineteenth century to further developments of Schopenhauer's thought; the same way of regarding the art of previous centuries descending from the perspective of religiousness very lively nourished visions, achievements and artistic projects and determined decisive consequences for the formulation of aesthetic purposes and the artistic practice throughout the Nineteenth century.

On the Intermediary Inner Workings of the Aesthetic Experience that Induces the Unfolding of the Sacred. Another Approach to Schopenhauer's Concept of the Will and Representation as the World

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The initial premise of this investigation is that the ontic fundament of the sacred experience narrated by the myth is of dialogue nature and more often than not being expressed in the mental or verbal exchange I-Thou, or I – thou conversation. Such a condition seems to prepare the moment when Logos may enter, and Logos is meant here as a creative power of mind.

I start with defining logos, than mythos and the notion of the sacredness from the contemporary religious studies perspective. Than I come up with my interpretation of the Schopenhauer's notion of world as a will and world as representation. Both factors are of aesthetic nature, the *will* manifested and perceived through sixth human senses' activity while the *representation* is inevitably associated with the aesthetic form of any kind. Finally I present the philosophical tradition that has investigated the nature of the aesthetic experience wherefrom my research approach emerges, namely Roman Ingarden's and Nicolas Hartman' phenomenological stand. Finally I elucidate my conclusive proposition that states that it is the very aesthetic experience's unfolding dynamics where Mythos and Logos may cooperatively coexist. The history of human art proves that that sacred art, a visible and tangible result of that interacting, emphasising the supreme role and power of the performing art, dance and theatre, in both leading to or trigging the experience of the sacred.

Ethics, Religious Action and Rational Representationalism

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Rational Representationalism is a philosophical theory that seeks to reconcile two competing perspectives in philosophy. While classical rationalism critiques representationalism for neglecting the mental, language, or logic and focusing only on the world and its representation, classical representationalism argues the opposite, criticising rationalism for overlooking the world and focusing solely on the mental, language, or logic. Rational Representationalism attempts to harmonize both perspectives by emphasizing rationality as the medium of representation (i.e., the mental, language, or logic) in the task of representing the world (cf. J. Lemanski: World and Logic. London 2021).

The theory of rational representationalism has precursors and companions, such as Bacon, Carnap, Chalmers, Kant, and Schopenhauer, who sought to mirror the world using logic. However, these approaches have been heavily criticized in both theoretical philosophy and in ethics and philosophy of religion. Notably, there is no approach that is both representative and normative in ethics and philosophy of religion, which may be due to the famous Is-ought problem that highlights the tension between representation and rationally based normativity.

The lecture outlined here initially focuses on the representationalist method developed by Schopenhauer in §§ 53 and 68 of his major work *The World as Will and Representation*. Schopenhauer establishes maxims with which ethical and religious action can be represented, and he classifies such action into positive (A) and negative categories ($\overline{A}$), referred to as the 'affirmation' and 'negation of the will'. Although philosophy only depicts and reflects, the recipient must decide between the two contradictory directions of action: Either I choose A or I choose the contradictory opposite B.

In this lecture, we argue that this representationalist theory is subject to a rational and logical claim that in turn presupposes norms. Through reflection, the recipient evaluates the positive and negative possibilities of action and decides between the two contradictory directions. For example: Either B or $\overline{B}$; Not B; Thus A.

This decision-making process relies on rational processes such as hypothesis, disjunction, negation, modus tollendo ponens, etc. However, normative aspects are required for making evaluations and decisions. These aspects are incumbent on

everyone who reflects and decides. Schopenhauer's example of the lives of the saints and the imitatio Christi illustrates the interplay of representation and rationality. Through reflection, the recipient evaluates religious action and decides for or against it. Thus, representation and rationality are interdependent.

Schopenhauer's Metaphysics in Confrontation with Phenomenological Theology: Schopenhauer's Response to Michel Henry's Critique

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This paper reconsidershow Michel Henry, a French phenomenological theologian, interpreted Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy, and attempts to respond to Henry's critique of that philosophy from Schopenhauer's own perspective.

In his principal work, *Généalogie de la Psychanalyse,* Henry offers an original interpretation of Schopenhauer's philosophywhich contains many remarkable differences between Schopenhauer's own definitions of key concepts and Henry's phenomenological – theological interpretation of them. This paper accounts for these differencesby drawing a methodological distinction between Schopenhauer, on the one hand, and Michel Henry's interpretation of Schopenhauer on the other. While in *L'Essence de la Manifestation* Henry presents 'affectivity' as a principle of his own thought, in *Généalogie de la Psychanalyse*he reinterprets the history of modern philosophy,making the concept of 'affectivity' its fundamental principle, so that he also reconstructs Schopenhauer's metaphysics in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* from the same perspective. Henry claims that Schopenhauer, having 'glimpsed but not conceptualized' this 'affectivity', consequently attributed a wider meaning to the concept of 'will' as a metaphysical principle. Henry therefore claims that Schopenhauer's identification of 'will' with this metaphysical principle is the result of a 'falsification' of the 'affectivity'. However, Schopenhauer's description of metaphysics is principally based on the opposite methodology: the analytic method

which starts from a given experience and attempts to reveal the higher philosophical principles which underlie it.

Employing this methodological distinction, this paper reconsiders Henry's interpretation of Schopenhauer's philosophy and attempts to respond to Henry's critique from Schopenhauer's own standpoint, focusing especially on Henry's critique of the concept of 'will' in Schopenhauer's philosophy. This paper discusses how Schopenhauer himself engages with the problemon which Henry focuses: that of 'denomination' regarding the 'reality of the external world'. In adopting the concept of '*denominatio a potiori*' when he calls that reality 'will', Schopenhauer was quite conscious that the concept of 'will' can be applied to the thing in itself only analogously. He thus employs suchan 'analogy' with the reality of one's own body when naming the reality of the external world. According to Schopenhauer, although he identifies the 'thing in itself' as will, this denomination is in fact inappropriate insofar as the concept of will has its origin in the most distinct appearance, i.e. in the movement of one's body. In this sense, Schopenhauer responds to the problem Henry presents by conceding that the concept of 'analogy' plays a central role in his metaphysics.

Mythos and Logos in Science from a Schopenhauerian Standpoint

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According to Schopenhauer's account on what he considers to be metaphysics, there are two kinds of metaphysical systems: the scholarly kind (philosophy), which may be called "doctrine of conviction"; and the popular kind (religion), which may be called "doctrine of faith". If one has the notions of *mythos* and *logos* in mind, at first glance it would seem that Schopenhauer is arguing for religions being *mythos* (along with other German philosophers' philosophies) and his own philosophy being *logos*. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's philosophy of knowledge may authorize us to understand how *logos* and *mythos* are not as separated as it would seem, which may allow us to understand modern science as a modern version of sorts of myths. How so? As an transcendental idealist, Schopenhauer claims in his doctoral dissertation that transcendental laws (postulated by him in his doctoral dissertation) presuppose nature's agreement to themselves. In other words, transcendental laws "force" scientific observations to fit their own lenses. The main question this communication poses therefore is: "what tells science apart from myths?". From this standpoint, science is not so far away from myths, even because both discourses, each in its own fashion, rely on metaphysics, according to Schopenhauer. Presenting the details of such Schopenhauer-inspired reading – by means of analyzing the relevant passages in his texts – is the goal of this communication.

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"Life is a jest …" The Importance of Logic
for the Negation of the Will

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For Schopenhauer the reason of religion consists in the necessity to elaborate an "interpretation of life", namely of one's own. The respective interpretation depends on the "grasping power" (Fassungskraft) of the individual. It refers to the great 4 questions mentioned by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (A 805/B 833), which we cannot get rid of because they belong to the nature of man, but which also cannot be answered definitively. Schopenhauer proposes a radical compression to three questions or, more precisely, to three question words. These are "Where from? Whither? Wherefore?" (P II. 383) Amazingly, these three questions form the basis of the three very interesting fragments supposedly taken from letters written in 1806 addressed to his mother Johanna. The impact of these fragments has been nearby ignored until now. In these notations, the young Schopenhauer – 18 years old! – tried to formulate his first tentative answers to the three main questions. His working plan of 1813 (HN I. 55) then indicates how a detailed philosophical clarification of the horizon of these three questions has to proceed in order to arrive at a really convincing answer. First, according to this plan, it is necessary to bracket the daily "world of imagination" (Welt der Vorstellung) which is common to all human beings. This is the main goal and purpose of the dissertation finalized 1813, as his Berlin lecture of 1820 shows in detail, especially in the chapter on the Theorem of Reason. Thus the foundation is laid for a philosophical justification of a possible and desirable 2 "negation" of the will, which the title of the fourth book of the World as Will and Imagination holds out in prospect. The Indians, much praised by Schopenhauer, concentrated on the bracketing of the world of knowledge, they did not know yet the riddle word, which the Sphinx wanted to hear, and which is not: "It is the man!" but "It is the will!" The 2nd part of the 4th book of the World as Will and Imagination then warily speaks of a "change of the leading signs" in order to hint at the upcoming fundamental change of our being. In this way the dissertation cleared the way for a philosophical religion like Buddhism, but then also for the philosophical negation of the world as suggested by his main work.

Schopenhauer on the Actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of Logos and Mythos

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In Schopenhauer's view, all valuable states – aesthetic, moral or salvific – arise from a relation between intuitive cognition (*Erkenntnis*) and willing, rather than abstract resolutions of reason (*Wissen*) (WWRI, 432). When reason guides practice, its objects, universal concepts, are taken up into the law of motivation, which states no more than that, given a sufficient motive the act will occur with necessity, irrespective of its value (BM, 126). Reason therefore follows the laws of the phenomenon governed by its inner controller, the will as thing-in-itself. The best that abstract maxims can counsel is prudence, by constraining the will to move in a different direction, but they are impotent to effect any real or actual change in the will itself.

By contrast, Schopenhauer attributes to immediate, intuitive cognition of sensuous particulars a capacity to occasion dispositions in the will that instantiate value. Aesthetic contemplation stills the wills of those susceptible to beauty (WWRI, 219); perception of another's suffering displaces the ordinary incentives of egoism in favour of compassion (BM, 200); while immediate cognition of the essence of the world and the suffering essential to it, brings about that quietening of the will that is salvation or holiness (WWRI, 311).

This contrast between the impotence of logically ordered concepts and the actual effects brought about by intuitive perception seems to receive a reverse appraisal in Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion. For Schopenhauer, philosophical and religious metaphysics cater to humanity's need for metaphysics, concerning why there is something rather than nothing and why that something manifests itself as a suffering world (WWRII, 181). Philosophy satisfies this need in the medium of concepts, *sensu stricto et proprio*, defending its claims in accordance with the canons of logic established by the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, thereby appealing to thought and conviction. By contrast, religious metaphysics conveys its teachings through imaginative myths, narratives and figures, *sensu allegorico*, issuing in belief grounded on authority (WWRII, 173-5). Religious metaphysics is, therefore, an ersatz solution to the need for metaphysics, akin to a wooden leg in place of a natural one (PPII, 302).

However, in the light of Schopenhauer's epistemological contrast between intuitive cognition and its rational reflection in concepts, it is difficult to discern what

actual benefit philosophy's conceptual account of the world and life might have over a mythical, religious one. The philosopher who knows the nature of art, morality and holiness in concepts is not, by virtue of such knowledge, able to create beauty, act morally or attain salvation, and those who do or can, are not hindered in their attainment of these goals by lack of philosophical knowledge. Philosophy is, says Schopenhauer, limited to interpretation and description without prescription, for the issue of "the worth or worthlessness of an existence, where salvation or damnation is in question" is not decided by dead concepts, but by the innermost essence of an individual's will (WWRI, 297-8).

But for this innermost essence to become actual in the phenomenon, what is required is intuitive cognition of vivid, sensuous scenes, scenes that are more reminiscent of the mythical pictures of religion than the inert abstractions of philosophy. Irrespective, therefore, of Schopenhauer's greater esteem for philosophical metaphysics over those of religion, contemplation of the cross or hearing the tale of Kisa Gotami and the Mustard Seed is more likely to give rise to that innermost relation between cognition and willing that results in holiness than reading *The World as Will and Representation*, and this is so whatever one's intellectual capacities.

Schopenhauer and the "Theoretical Oracle" of Intellectual Intuition

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This paper will examine the conflict between mythos and logos in Schopenhauer's philosophy by considering his criticism of the notion of intellectual intuition, as well as the extent to which his own philosophy makes use of this notion. Despite his great admiration for Kant's theoretical philosophy, Schopenhauer charged Kant's practical philosophy with illegitimately introducing a theistic mode of explanation in the form of the categorical imperative. He likens our supposed awareness of the moral law to revelation, which he takes to be the foundation of all theism, and claims that Kant's commitment to this 'practical oracle' laid the groundwork the 'theoretical oracle' of intellectual intuition introduced by the post-Kantian idealists.

In laying claim to such a faculty, Fichte and Schelling trespass beyondthe bounds of rational knowledge, intelligibility, and explanation, which Schopenhauer takes to be governed and demarcated by the principle of sufficient reason.Intellectual intuition rather constitutes a remnant of religious mysticism that is wholly alien to philosophical reasoning and empirical cognition, an instrument of mythos rather than logos.

However, scholars such as Arthur Drews and D.W. Hamlyn have argued that Schopenhauer is himself committed to modes of knowledge that go beyond the principle of sufficient reason and that can be classified as intellectual intuition.

To investigate these matters, I will first give an account of the concept of 'intellectual intuition' situated within the Kantian distinction of the finite, ectypal mind and the divine, archetypal mind. Second, I will give a brief summary of Schopenhauer's notion of representation, the principle of sufficient reason, and the associated restrictions he places on the validity of explanations and knowledge-claims. Third, I will describe and reconstruct the claims that constitute his criticism of the concept of 'intellectual intuition' in Idealist philosophy. In light of these, I will then examine the kinds of cognitions postulated by Schopenhauer which he does not take to be governed by the principle of sufficient reason. These concern (1) the knowledge I have of my body as an objectification of will, (2) the knowledge of the ideas gained in the contemplation of art and nature, (3) the knowledge I have of others as will, as manifested in compassion, and (4) the salvation gained from the denial of will.

I will argue that Schopenhauer's real issue with the German Idealists' notion of intellectual intuition does not truly consist in its freedom from the principle of sufficient reason, but its optimistic, theodicean aims. Hence, he only objects to mystical or religious modes of knowledge if they are incompatible with the persistence of suffering or serve to provide a justification for this suffering.

The Significance of the Saint Painting in Schopenhauer's Philosophy

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Schopenhauer developed his own theory of aesthetics and art based on the metaphysics of the will, and he valued music highly among the various arts as the only one that can directly express the will, (others expressing the "Platonic Idea", the objectification of the will). Music, however, lacks a direct relationship to the Idea, which is the essence of the world and of life, and has little connection to the thought of the "negation of the will" that is caused by its perception. Rather, in this respect, the saint painting (Heiligenbild), which depicts Christian saints who embody the "negation of the will", is a more significant art form in his philosophical system.

In his aesthetics and art theory, the saint painting is treated as a genre of historical painting (Historienmalerei). The defining characteristic of historical painting is that it depicts the importance of historical scenes, events, and actions as "outer significance", while expressing the essence of humanity, or the Idea of humanity, as "inner significance". However, a saint painting primarily depicts neither historical events nor deeds, but saints who are filled with the true Christian spirit. In this sense, a saint painting places much more emphasis on the depiction of inner than outer significance as the Idea of humanity. Furthermore, while historical painting generally depicts the "affirmation of the will" aspect of humanity, the saint painting depicts the "negation of the will" aspect of humanity. This duality of the Idea of humanity is also closely related to his interpretation of Adam (the symbol of the "affirmation of the will") and Christ (the symbol of the "negation of the will") in his theory of religion.

Therefore, the saint painting, by its unique characteristics, is not a mere historical painting, and the impression it gives us is almost a religious one.

In proof of this, Schopenhauer refers to Raphael's "St Cecilia" as a symbol of the transition from art to religion in his main work, *The World as Will and Representation*. At the end of the book, Schopenhauer also states that the truly sacred and de-mundane expression of a person who has completely negated the will can be found in the paintings of saints by such masters as Raphael and Correggio. The expression on the faces of these saints isa complete apprehension of the whole essence of the world and of life, in which the "negation of the will" aspect of the Idea of humanity is expressed with extreme clarity. This not only temporarily quiets the will of the contemplator, but also inspires a remedy from suffering through religion, which goes one step further than art. Therefore, in Schopenhauer's philosophy, the saint painting occupies a unique position bridging art and religion, and it also presents his thought of the "negation of the will" to us in an intuitive way.

Pascalian Infinite "Simplectic Poly-numbers" and Creation *ex nihilo*

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A very important concept since ancient Greek philosophy for thinking metaphysical and religious matters is that of "opposition". However, remained for a long time a conceptual "terra franca" (i.e. a concept grounded in at least three radically different traditions, like archetypical contrary binarism, Hegelian-Marxian "dialectics" and logical contradictory negation), the concept of opposition, since 20 years, has unfolded into a full-fledged new branch of mathematics, "oppositional geometry" (a.k.a. "logical geometry"). Recently it has been demonstrated (cf. Moretti 2022) that: (1) the mathematical "home" of classical oppositional geometry is Pascal's infinite arithmetical triangle: each classical n-closure is bijective with one of the rows of the infinite arithmetical triangle; (2) the mathematical "home" of non-classical oppositional geometry are the geometrical simplectic generalisations of Pascal's triangle, namely the infinite series of the Pascalian simplexes, whose "horizontal sections" are bijective with the non-classical n-oppositions. In this paper we propose some new mathematical results about such Pascalian simplexes, which lead us to the new concept of Pascalian "infinite simplectic poly-numbers", inside which the already known Pascalian structures receive a framework and new tools. We suggest that some structures unveiled through this new geometry can serve as powerful conceptual metaphors for thinking some classical metaphysical issues. We focus on the "henological scheme" of the Platonic and neo-Platonic (but in part also Hegelian) tradition: Pascal's triangle bears striking resemblances with some fundamental parts of it, notably in the flowing infinite succession of its growing numerical rows, going downward into infinite mathematical complexity, but starting from a single number "1" (readable as "God" or "Fiat!"). Our new spaces can reverse and dilute into back-wards infinite (interpretable as reversed "creation time") the downward creation of any of the infinitely descending Pascalian simplexes. This suggests that creation ex nihilo could be conceived as an illusion, an infinite numerical-geometrical game, ontologically self-grounded in previously unknown fundamental symmetries.

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